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RECENT DECISIONS

EVIDENCE LAW-THE

PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

IN FEDERAL COURTS

At the cornerstone of our judicial system is the belief that the
trier of fact must have access to all relevant information in order to
make a fair and accurate determination on the merits of each case.'
Since evidentiary privileges have the effect of withholding information from the court, they "are not lightly created nor expansively
construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth."' 2 The
extent to which information should be deemed privileged has been
the subject of continuing debate and disagreement. One specific
privilege that has recently received attention is the psychotherapistpatient privilege.
The common law generally did not afford protection against disclosure of psychotherapist-patient communications, 3 and state legislation has been the predominant method of affording the privilege in
state courts. 4 In 1975, Congress enacted comprehensive rules of evil For more than three centuries a fundamental maxim of the law has been that the
public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke) "has a right to every man's evidence." 8
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961); see
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331
(1950).
2 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
3 See the report prepared for the House Judiciary Committee on the current law of
privileges in federal courts, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW OF TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES IN FEDERAL COURTS,
reprintedin S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 233, 248

(3d ed. 1982). For a discussion of state court common law treatment of privilege, see Annot.,
44 A.L.R. 3d 24, 45 (1972).
4 Some form of psychotherapist-patient privilege has been adopted in the following
states: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 34-26-2 (1975); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 08.86.200 (1983);
Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2085 (1976); Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001
(1979); California, CAL. EVID. CODE § 1010 (West 1966); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 1390 -07(g) (1973); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146c (West Supp. 1983); Florida,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90-503 (West 1979); Georgia, GA. CODE § 38-418 (1981); Hawaii, HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 33-626, 1980 Special Rules Pamphlet, Rule 504.1 (1980); Idaho, IDAHO CODE
§ 54-2314 (1979); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 91 1/2, § 801 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); Indiana, IND. CODE § 25-33-1-17 (1976); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West Supp. 1983);
Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5323 (1980); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.215
(Baldwin 1983); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3734 (West Supp. 1983); Maryland,
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-109 (1980); Massachusetts, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
233, § 20B (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1750
(West 1980); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West Supp. 1984); Mississippi, MISS.
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dence for federal courts which included a general privilege rule, Rule
501. 5 The rule provides that determination of privilege questions
shall be governed by the principles of the common law except that in
civil cases involving a claim or defense to which state law supplies the
rule of decision, the privilege is to be determined according to state
law. As Professor Wright has noted, the case law is in "considerable
confusion. "6
This comment focuses on the psychotherapist-patient privilege
in federal courts. Parts I and II examine privileges generally and the
psychotherapist-patient privilege in particular. Part III, after having
concluded that this relationship merits protection, discusses Rule 501
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Since the courts have not agreed
on the proper application of Rule 501, Part III also focuses on the
legislative history of the rule in an attempt to ascertain the congressional intent that lies behind it. Part IV then analyzes the recent
federal cases addressing the issue, particularly those cases in which
federal law governs, to determine the trend of the law on psychotherCODE ANN. § 73-31-29 (1972); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 337.055 (Vernon Supp. 1984);
Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-807 (1983); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504
(1979); Nevada, NEv. REV. STAT. § 49-215 (1981); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 330-A. 19 (1966); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14B-28 (West 1978); New Mexico, N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 61-9-18 (1978); New York, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW AND R. § 4507 (McKinney
Supp. 1983); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.3 (1981); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4732.19 (Page 1977); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2503 (West 1980); Oregon,
OR. REV. STAT. § 40.230 (1981); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-1 (Supp. 1983);
South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-13-6 (1979) and § 36-27A-38 (Supp. 1983);
Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-207 (1980); Texas, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
5561h (Vernon Supp. 1982); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-25-8 (Supp. 1983); Vermont, VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1612 (Supp. 1983); Virginia, VA. CODE § 8.01-400.2 (Supp. 1983);
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.83.110 (1978); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 273-1 (1980); Wisconsin, WIs. STAT. ANN. § 905.04 (West 1975); Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-27-103 (1983). These enactments vary widely in scope and application. In re Zuniga,
714 F.2d 632, 639 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 426 (1983). See generaly R. ALLEN, E.
FERSTER & J. RUBIN, READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 239-49 (1975); Annot., 44 A.L.R.

3d 24 (1972).
5 Rule 501 as enacted reads as follows:
Rule 501. General Rule
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of
a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of
a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EvID. 501.
6 S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 3, at 234.
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apist-patient privilege. In conclusion, this comment suggests that the
psychotherapist-patient relationship merits protection and can be
best protected by a specific privilege rule. The legislative history of
Rule 501 indicates that Congress, in rejecting the specific psychotherapist-patient privilege proposed by the Supreme Court in Rule 504
and in providing for case-by-case development of privilege rules, did
not intend to freeze the law of privileges or to preclude submission of
a new psychotherapist-patient rule. Since present Rule 501 has been
inconsistently applied by the federal courts and leaves protection of
confidential communications largely to the discretion of the trial
judge, enactment of a specific psychotherapist-patient privilege rule
is advisable.
I.

Privileges Generally

A testimonial privilege is a "rule that gives a person a right to
refuse to disclose information to a tribunal that would otherwise be
entitled to demand and make use of that information in performing
its assigned function."' 7 In other words, a privilege allows a person to
withhold from a court information which might otherwise be sufficiently relevant and accurate to justify its admission into evidence.
Since decisions on privileges may affect a person's right to privacy8 and to a fair trial, they have serious ramifications for both systemic interests and individual rights. Of course, making all relevant
information available to the courts-that is, denying all privilegeswould facilitate adjudication of issues. But granting privileges serves
to promote other societal interests which may outweigh the interest
in adjudicating issues. 9 The decision whether to grant a privilege is,
7 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5422 (1980).
Of course, as Professor Wright points out, a privilege may include the right to prevent another person from disclosing the information or may give its possessor the right to refuse to
become a witness. Id. at 667 n.5.
8 [P]rivacy entails voluntary control over the extent of one's intellectual isolation
and a secure ability to control how much information is disseminated about oneself,
as well as the scope and circumstances of its communication.
. .Individuals constantly seek a balance between personal secrecy and social
participation. The right of privacy permits them to seek their own balance without
being forced to choose between the extremes of total secrecy or total disclosure. By
providing individuals with a tool to control the limits of the dissemination of personal information they choose to disclose, testimonial privileges serve as important
protectors of the right of privacy.
Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Privileges under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested
Approach, 64 GEO. L.J. 613, 648, 651-52 (1976).
9 Privileges are important, according to Professor Louisell, because

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[19841

in the final analysis, the outcome of a delicate balancing test, in
which individual rights are weighed against a court's right and need
to know the truth.
With respect to individual rights, privilege rules attempt to protect two broad areas-confidential professional relationships and. an
individual's zone of privacy. 10 These areas are interrelated and they
may or may not be present in any of the relationships where a privilege is asserted." Both arise in the setting of the psychotherapistpatient relationship.
II.

The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege

For the purposes of this article, the term "psychotherapist" includes psychiatrists, psychologists, psychotherapists, and licensed or
certified counselors, as well as physicians to the extent that they serve
their patients in a counseling capacity. Where it is recognized, a psychotherapist-patient privilege protects the confidential communications between a psychotherapist and his patient by assuring that the
historic privileges of confidential communication protect significant human values
in the interest of the holders of the privileges, and. . . the fact that the existence of
these guarantees sometimes results in the exclusion from a trial of probative evidence is merely a secondary and incidental feature of the privileges' vitality. These
convictions contrast with much recent thinking which regards the privileges chiefly
from the viewpoint of their exclusionary function in litigation, and deprecates their
social and moral significance and worth.
Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confiuion." Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L.
REV. 101, 101 (1956).
10 Green and Nesson classify privileges into two distinct types. The first is based on the
professional counseling relationship between the holder of the privilege and the individual for
the purpose of fostering the effective rendering of the professional service. Privileges of this
type include the lawyer-client, physician-patient, and priest-penitent as well as the accountant-client, social worker-client, and stockbroker-client. The second type seeks to throw a veil
of secrecy around specific zones of privacy to protect individual autonomy and human dignity. The marital privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination are the most common
of this type. E. GREEN & C. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 52526 (1983). The underlying rationales for the privileges are unchanged whether privileges are
treated broadly as protecting these two areas or classified into the two types as Green and
Nesson have.
11 Some other areas in which privileges have been asserted include: newsmen and their
sources, see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); researchers and their sources, see United
States v. Doe, 460 F.2d 328 (Ist Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Popkin v. United States, 411
U.S. 909 (1973); draft counselors and their clients, see In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D.
Cal. 1971); Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Harris v.
United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969); insurance companies and their insureds, see Gottlieb v. Bresler, 24 F.R.D. 371 (D.D.C. 1959); and accountants and their clients, see United
States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949); United States v. Schmidt, 343 F.
Supp. 444 (M.D. Pa. 1972). S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 3, at 246.
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psychotherapist cannot be compelled to divulge the communications
in court.
Some federal courts have mistakenly equated the psychotherapist-patient privilege with the physician-patient privilege and immediately dismissed the former as unnecessary t2 The common law did
not recognize a physician-patient privilege because "the considerations which relate to physicians and their patients do not require that
an exception should be made to the general liability of all persons to
give testimony upon all facts that are the subject of legitimate inquiry in the administration of justice."13 But there are two fundamental differences between the two relationships which require that
4
they be treated separately.'
First, the differing contexts in which the information becomes
the subject of judicial inquiry suggest that the patient receiving psychiatric treatment requires more protection. Second, a patient's
communications with his physician generally are not as potentially
damaging as those with his psychotherapist. In fact, the very nature
of the communications between psychotherapist and patient is such
that confidentiality is critical to the patient, the psychotherapist, and
society.
The information a physician has about his patient is usually not
12 United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (11 th Cir. 1983); United States v. Meagher,
531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976); United States v. Williams, 337 F.
Supp.. 1114 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
13 United States v. Kansas City Lutheran Home & Hosp. Ass'n, 297 F.Supp. 239, 244
(W.D. Mo. 1969). See United States v. Mancuso, 444 F.2d .691 (5th Cir. 1971); Barnes v.
United States, 374 F.2d 126 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 917 (1967).
14 Professor Wigmore formulated four tests as criteria for the validity of a privilege, saying that a negative answer to any one of the tests would leave the privilege without support.
They are: (1) Does the communication in the usual circumstances of the given professional
relation originate in a confidence that it will not be disclosed? (2) Is the inviolability of that
confidence essential to the achievement of the purpose of the relationship? (3) Is the relation
one that should be fostered? and (4) Is the expected injury to the relation, through the fear of
later disclosure, greater than the expected benefit to justice in obtaining the testimony? 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2285. Wigmore contended that the physician-patient relationship
succeeded only on the third test and therefore ought not to be privileged. Id. §§ 2380-91.
Most legal scholars agree. See, e.g., Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is justice Seraed or Obstructedby Closing the Doctor'sMouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607 (1943); Curd, Privileged Communications Between the Doctorand his Patient-An Anomal of the Law, 44 W. VA. L.Q.
165 (1938).
Several writers have noted, however, that Wigmore's four tests are satisfied in the context
of psychotherapist-patient relations. See, e.g., Slovenko, Pychiat and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 175 (1960), cited in FED. R. EvID. 504 advisory committee
note; see also Note, ConfidentialCommunications to a Piychotherapist: A New TestimonialPrivilege, 47
Nw. U.L. REv. 384, 386-87 (1952); 4 GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORTS AND SYMPOSIUMS, REPORT No. 45, 95 (1960) [hereinafter cited as REPORT No. 45 ].
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the type of information a third party would bring into court unless
the patient himself has made it the subject of litigation. Generally,
medical records or a physician's testimony become the subject of judicial attention because the patient has sued someone in relation to
his condition or has chosen to use such information as part of a
defense.
A psychotherapist's records or testimony may, however, become
the subject ofjudicial attention despite the fact that the patient himself does not bring them into issue. A third person may initiate involuntary commitment proceedings against a patient, 15 or a parent
involved in a custody battle may subpoena the psychiatric records of
the other parent in an effort to establish that he is unfit to raise the
child.' 6 Thus, while medical evidence generally comes into litigation
at the patient's request, psychiatric evidence frequently comes into
litigation at the request of another.' 7 The potential for prejudice and
abuse is certainly heightened when a third party and not the patient
seeks the information.
An even more important distinction between the physician-patient relationship and the psychotherapist-patient relationship lies in
the type of information that each relationship produces. Medical evidence of high blood pressure or an irregular heartbeat would probably have no bearing at all on a court's decision as to competency or
custody. Psychiatric evidence of depression or emotional instability
might be instrumental in committing a person to an institution or
denying a parent custody of his children. The very testimonial nature of the information produced in the psychotherapist-patient relationship requires confidentiality far beyond that which may be
afforded to a physician and his patient. Indeed, safeguarding confidentiality protects legitimate interests of the patient, the psychotherapist, and society.
The patient has an interest in receiving effective treatment. To
this end, confidentiality is crucial in psychotherapist-patient rela15 See generally D. MARTINDALE & E. MARTINDALE, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW: THE
CRUSADE AGAINST INVOLUNTARY HOSPITALIZATION (1973).
16 An example of such a case isln re "B", 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d 419 (1978). A mother's

psychiatric hospitalization records, subpoenaed in a child custody case, were deemed unprotected by a privilege statute. The doctor successfully resisted the subpoena, however, on the
basis of a state constitutional right to privacy. See generally Slovenko, Fychological Testimony and
Presumptionsin Child Custody Cases, in LAW AND ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 167

(C. Hofling ed. 1981).
17 For a discussion of the increased incidence of psychiatric testimony, see REPORT No.
45, supra note 14, at 97-99.
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tions,' 8 less crucial in the physician-patient relationship. 19 The pa-

tient also has a legitimate interest in protecting information about
psychiatric treatment because of the social stigma attached to such
treatment. 20 Persons who have or who are perceived as having
"mental afflictions" suffer stigmatization and discrimination.

The

18 REPORT No. 45 recognized the psychiatrist's special need to maintain confidentiality:
"His capacity to help his patients is completely dependent upon their willingness and ability
to talk freely. This makes it difficult if not impossible for him to function without being able
to assure his patients of confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication." REPORT
No. 45, supra note 14, at 92.
Judge Luther Alverson, in an address before the Connecticut Mental Health Association,
stated that he believes there is more justification for the psychotherapist-patient privilege
than any of the other privileges recognized by law.
The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone else in the world. He
lays bare his entire self, his dreams, fantasies, sins and shames. . . . It would be too
much to expect them to do so if they knew that all they say, and all that the psychiatrist learns from what they say, may be revealed to the whole world from the witness
stand.
L. Alverson, Address before the Connecticut Mental Health Association (June, 1958), quoted
in M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272 (1952).
For a discussion of the need for confidential communications in psychotherapist-patient
relations, see M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, srupra, at 269-87. See also Denkowski, ClientCounselor Confdentialit,: An UpdateofRationale, LegalStatus, andImp/ications, PERSONNEL & GUIDANCE J., Feb. 1982, at 371 (a view that the need for confidentiality to provide effective
treatment does not of itself compel the conclusion that a privilege is warranted, but two other
factors do compel this conclusion-protecting clients from social stigma and promoting vital
client rights).
The authors of a work on psychiatry argue that a rough equivalence exists between the
priest-penitent and psychotherapist-patient relationships in terms of the need for confidentiality. Both relationships are based on concern, sensible involvement, sympathy, and a respect
for the dignity of the individual. This respect for dignity is expressed in part in the tradition
of privileged communication, a tradition long upheld by custom, although seldom by law.
Both patient and parishioner are encouraged to place full confidence in the psychiatrist or
clergyman, and this confidence is almost absolutely necessary to effective treatment. J.
EWALT & D. FARNSWORTH, TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 299 (1963).
19 See Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (while many physical
ailments might be treated effectively by a doctor whom the patient does not trust, a psychiatrist must have his patient's confidence in order to help him); see also Slovenko, supra note 14,
at 186.
20- A recent article concludes that guaranteeing confidentiality is necessary in the clientcounselor relationship. Doing so helps motivate those who require treatment to seek it and
prevents the stigmatization of clients who have sought therapy. Denkowski, supra note 18, at
372. This is a legitimate interest of the patient which adds force to the argument for protecting psychotherapist-patient confidentiality. However, this does not suggest that the fact of
treatment should be within the scope of the privilege, and most cases have declined to extend
the privilege this far. See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 426
(1983); In re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1983); Flora v. Hamilton, 81 F.R.D. 576
(M.D.N.C. 1978); Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). At least one commentator, however, encourages extending the psychotherapist-patient privilege to cover the
fact of treatment. See R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATION 41-42 (1966); Slovenko, supra note 14, at 187-88.
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public generally fears and dislikes the mentally ill and believes them
to be unpredictable and untrustworthy. 2 ' This social stigma is not
attached to the physically ill, or at least not to the same degree.
The interests of the psychotherapist would also be best served by
recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege. The psychotherapist's ability to provide effective treatment for his patients is impaired if his patients cannot trust him to keep their conversations
absolutely confidential. 22 Indeed, unlike the physician, the psychotherapist has a very special need for confidentiality, for "[h]is capacity to help his patients is completely dependent upon their
willingness to talk freely. This makes it difficult if not impossible for
him to function without being able to assure his patients of confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication.''23
Additionally, forcing a psychotherapist to divulge his patient's
secrets may put him in a morally intolerable position. One writer
has contended:
[A]ny values to judicial administration inherent in attempts to
force the psychotherapist to disgorge the secrets of his patients are
over-balanced by: (1) the inducement to perjury implicit in such
attempts and (2) the harm to the human personality, and hence
to freedom,24 in governmental forcing of a serious conflict of
conscience.

Just as the patient and the psychotherapist have an interest in
the availability of effective psychiatric treatment, so does society as a
whole. It is possible that a mentally ill person will pose a danger to
others. 25 Even aside from this, society benefits from its members'
21

A series of government surveys documented that such stigmatization occurs. H.E.W.,
Printing Office 1963).
See generally R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (1973); Denkowski, supra note 18;
Sloan & Klein, PschotherapeuticDisclosure:A Conf Between Right andDuty, 6 U. TOL. L. REv.
PUBLIC OPINIONS AND ATTITUDES ABOUT MENTAL HEALTH (Gov't

55 (1977).
22 A 1978 study reported that 95% of clinicians believe their clients expected communications would remain confidential. R. Jagim, W. Wittman, & J. Noll, Mental Health Professionals' Attitudes Toward Confidentiality, Privilege and Third Party Disclosure, reported in
PROF. PSYCHOLOGY, Sept. 1978, at 458, col. 1. The ethical standards of the American Psychiatric Association requires a psychotherapist to protect actively the interests of his clients. Am.
Psychiatric Assoc., The Principles of Medical Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable
to Psychiatry, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1058-64 (1973) [hereinafter cited asA.P.A. EthicalStandards]. The psychotherapist, therefore, has an obligation to promote his clients' interests in
privacy and good reputation. See Denkowski, supra note 18.
23 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 638 (quoting REPORT No. 45, supra note 14).
24 Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World- Part I, 41 MINN. L. REV. 731, 750
(1957); see Louisell, supra note 9.
25 What a psychiatrist should do if he believes his patient poses a danger to someone is
another question altogether, beyond the scope of this article. In Tarasoff v. Regents of the
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health, both in body and mind. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit has observed that "the inability to obtain effective psychiatric
treatment may preclude the enjoyment and exercise of many fundamental freedoms .

. .

.The interest of the patient in exercising his

rights is also society's interest, for society benefits from its members[']
'26
active enjoyment of their freedom.
Safeguarding psychotherapist-patient confidentiality promotes
important individual, professional, and societal interests. The relationship, therefore, merits protection. However, it does not necessar27
ily follow that a privilege is appropriate.
A privilege is appropriate when the interests furthered by confidentiality in a particular relationship are substantial enough to outweigh the interest in presentment of all the evidence. Most courts
and legal scholars agree that the attorney-client relationship meets
this standard. 28 Similarly, the substantial individual, professional,
and societal interests advanced by protecting psychotherapist-patient
confidentiality justify recognizing the privilege.
The PinciplesofMedicalEthics with AnnotationsEspecialy Applicable
to Psychiaty, although promoting confidentiality of patient informaUniv. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974)(en banc),afdinpart and
rev'din parton rehg, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976)(en banc), Poddar,
a patient, confided to a therapist at the University of California hospital his intention to harm
a young woman. The therapist consulted with two psychiatrists and initiated action to have
police detain the patient. However, the police let Poddar go and the therapist and psychiatrists took no further action. Poddar subsequently killed the young woman. Her parents sued
the therapist and psychiatrists in tort. The California Supreme Court upheld liability under
a "duty to warn." The court stated: "Public policy favoring protection of the confidential
character of patient-psychotherapist relationship must yield in instances in which disclosure is
essential to avert danger to others; the protective privilege ends where the public peril begins." 529 P.2d at 561. For a discussion of Tarasof and its implications for the practicing
psychotherapist, see B. SCHuTZ, LEGAL LIABILITY IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 53-66 (1982); R.L.
SCHWITZGEBEL & R.K. SCHWITZGEBEL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE 204-09 (1980);

Dix, Tarasoffand the Duty to Warn Potential Victims, in LAW AND ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF
PSYCHIATRY 118 (C. Hofling ed. 1981); Note, The Scope ofa Psychiatrist'sDuty to ThirdPersonr:
The ProtectivePrivilege Ends Where the Public PerilBegins, 59 NOTRE DAME L. R-v. 770 (1984).
26 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 639.
27 If the communications were rarely or never sought for judicial purposes, a privilege
would be unnecessary. Another possibility is that the psychotherapist should be deemed incompetent to testify or psychiatric records deemed irrelevant, on the grounds that the information is inherently unreliable.
Although absolutely necessary in treatment, data from free-association, or fantasies,
or memories, are not reliable for use in court as they mostly represent the way the
person experienced an event, and not how the event occurred. They are not 'facts.'
Psychic reality is not the same thing as actual reality.
Slovenko, supra note 14, at 194.
28 See, e.g., United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1964); Radiant Burners, Inc.
v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
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tion, does not protect the patient in a judicial setting.29 It follows

that the pychotherapist must be able to assert a privilege in order to
fulfill his ethical duties to his patient, 30 as well as to protect his professional relationship with the patient. Recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege is the only way to protect patients' rights in a
judicial setting. 31 The interest in protecting this relationship is sufficient to compel many legal scholars to agree that some form of privilege is appropriate under some circumstances; however, there is no
32
general agreement beyond this.
The question of how certain professional relationships and the
zone of privacy should be protected has been the subject of much
debate among legal scholars. The debate covers the whole spectrum
of analysis from Wigmore's utilitarian approach 33 to Professor Alan
29 A.P.A. Ethical Standards, supra note 22. Ethical standards are frequently intended to
protect the professions rather than to safeguard the rights of the clients. See Smith, Unfinished
Business with Informed Consent Procedures, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, Jan. 1981, at 22, col. I.
30 The American Medical Association (AMA) Principles of Medical Ethics prohibits
physicians from divulging confidential information about their patients outside of a courtroom setting. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS & REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL
COUNCIL, Principles of Medical Ethics 5-66 (1969). Since the nature of the information held
by physicians is such that it rarely becomes an issue unless the patient himself has made it so,
the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics generally is adequate to protect the privacy interests of
the patient.
In contrast, psychiatric information frequently becomes the subject of judicial inquiry.
Therefore, the A.P.A. Ethical Standards, which carry no weight in the face of a court order to
testify or produce records, are inadequate to protect the psychiatric patient. A.P.A. Ethical
Standards, supra note 22.
31 One writer has suggested that patients should be given a Miranda-type warning alerting them to the possibility that complete confidentiality might be abandoned under certain
circumstances. Powledge, The Therapistas Double Agent, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, July 1977, at
44, col. 1. One such circumstance would be if the patient has become a danger to himself or
to others. The warning would put the patient on notice that the psychotherapist is not the
exclusive servant of the patient but has obligations to society as well.
While such a warning might be a good idea, it actually would do little or nothing to
protect the patient. The purpose of a Miranda warning is to alert the arrestee to the consequences of his words so that he might choose to avoid incriminating himself. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966). A person undergoing psychiatric treatment, however, cannot
and should not be expected to avoid incriminating revelations. In fact, this result would tend
to defeat the purpose of the treatment. "The essence of psychotherapy is confidential personal revelations about matters which the patient is and should be reluctant to discuss."
Slovenko, supra note 14, at 184. Thus, such a warning does nothing more than tell the patient
in advance that his privacy rights may be violated, which ought not to be confused with
protecting his rights.
32 Many commentators agree that recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege is appropriate when the information sought relates to actual communications between the psychotherapist and his patient and the cost to judicial administration is insubstantial. See, e.g., 2 J.
WEINSTEIN

& M.

BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE

Slovenko, supra note 14.
33 See note 14 supra.

504[01]-[08] (1982 & Supp. 1983);
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Westin's focus on humanistic values. 34 Wigmore focuses on the instrumental purpose of the communication and the cost/benefit effect

on the litigation process. 3 5 Proponents of the humanistic approach
criticize Wigmore's approach as overvaluing accuracy in the judicial
process while undervaluing other important values such as privacy,
36
dignity, intimacy, anonymity, and individuality.
At least two authors, however, propose that it is unnecessary to

choose sides in the debate and that perhaps neither side can provide
a satisfactory explanation for recognition of some privileges and re37
fusal to recognize privileges in seemingly similar relationships.
Privileges may, instead, be allocated to segments of society through
exercise of relative power and influence.3 8 This debate notwithstand-

ing, Congress, in 1975, chose to protect professional relationships and
privacy interests through a general privilege rule, leaving the extent

of particular privileges to be developed by the federal courts.
III.

Federal Rule of Evidence 501

Today, one rule of evidence governs all questions of privilege in
federal courts. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides
that the question of privilege will "be governed by the principles of
the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the

United States in the light of reason and experience. ' '3 9 The rule also
states that in civil actions "with respect to an element of a claim or
defense to which state law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege
. . . shall be determined in accordance with State law." 40 Basically,

the rule means that in diversity cases, state law concerning privileges
34 According to Professor Westin, important functions are furthered by privacy in communications in modern democratic societies. These functions include: personal autonomy,
which in turn permits sheltered experimentation and testing of ideas; emotional release, by
affording relaxation from role-playing pressures, opportunity for rest, and venting of anger
without fear of being held accountable; self-evaluation, by giving an individual time to process information and decide when to make more general publications; and limited and protected communications with those he trusts. E. GREEN & C. NESSON, supra note 10, at 522.
35 Id. at 520.
36 Id. at 522; see Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privilege in FederalCourts: An Alternative to the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 85-94 (1973) (criticizing the Supreme
Court's approach, including a general discussion of the modern trend toward an instrumental
view of privileges).
37 E. GREEN & C. NESSON, supra note 10, at 525. Privileges in the lawyer-client, physician-patient, and priest-penitent relationships have been generally recognized but not in the
accountant-client, social worker-client, and stockbroker-client relationships. Id.
38 Id. at 526.
39 See note 5 supra.
40 Id.
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will apply and with respect to federal question cases, federal law will
41
apply.
Rule 501 as enacted by Congress amounted to a congressional
repudiation of the Advisory Committee's views.4 2 It is helpful, therefore, when examining how the privilege rules should be applied, to
look to the history of the proposed rules, their intended effect, and
the Advisory Committee's rationale for the rules.
By order of the United States Supreme Court, on November 20,
43
1972, the proposed rules of evidence were transmitted to Congress.
They were the culmination of seven years' work by the Advisory
Committee on Rules of Evidence, appointed by Chief Justice Earl
Warren. 44 The Supreme Court's 45 proposal consisted of thirteen
rules, including nine specific privileges. 46 Rule 501 provided that
only privileges required by the Constitution, enacted by Congress, or
adopted in rules by the Supreme Court would be available in the
federal courts.4 7 Rules 502-510 set forth specific privileges includ41 According to the report on the current law of privileges prepared for the House Judiciary Committee, under the heading "Physician-Patient (Psychotherapist-Patient) Privilege":
"As a general rule federal courts apply the law of the State in which they are sitting to all
issues of privilege in diversity cases. . . In non-diversity cases, the federal courts do not
recognize the physician-patient privilege. United States v. Mancuso,.444 F.2d 691 (5th Cir.
1971).. . ." S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 3, at 238.
42

23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 684; see a/so 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUEL-

LER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 200 (1978) (rejecting not only the approach taken through the
specific rules but also the basic premises underlying the proposal).
43 The rules were prescribed in accordance with federal law. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3771,
3772 (1982) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2075 (1976); see Rules of Evidence for United States
Courts & Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972). On Feb. 7, 1973, the House of Representatives
Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws began hearings on the proposed
rules. ProposedRules of Evidence: HearingsBefore the Special Subcomm. on Refonn of Federal Crminal
Laws ofthe House Comm. on theJudiciag, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Hungate) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
44 The rules had been approved by the Judicial Conference Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure and by the Judicial Conference in October, 1971. Hearings,
supra note 43, at 1.
45 Although the rules are attributed to the Supreme Court, as Justice Douglas pointed
out in his dissent to the order prescribing the proposed rules, the Court did not write the rules,
or supervise their writing, or rule on their merits. A committee named by the Judicial Conference writes the rules, and the Court is a mere conduit. 56 F.R.D. at 185. He did not deny,
however, the Court's approval of the rules: "[T]he public assumes that our imprimatur is on
the Rules, as of course it is." Id.
46 56 F.R.D. at 230-56.
47 Proposed rule 501 provided as follows:
Rule 501. Privileges Recognized Only as Provided
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ing 48 a psychotherapist-patient privilege in Rule 504.4 9 Through the

proposed rules the Committee sought to do away with the common
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress, and except as provided in these rules or in other rules
adopted by the Supreme Court, no person has a privilege to:
(1) Refuse to be a witness; or
(2) Refuse to disclose any matter; or
(3) Refuse to produce any object or writing; or
(4) Prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any matter or producing
any object or writing.
56 F.R.D. at 230.
48 The specific privileges in Rules 502-510 included: Required reports (Proposed Rule
502), lawyer-client (Proposed Rule 503), psychotherapist-patient (Proposed Rule 504), husband-wife (Proposed Rule 505), communications to clergymen (Proposed Rule 506), political
vote (Proposed Rule 507), trade secrets (Proposed Rule 508), secrets of state and other official
information (Proposed Rule 509), and identity of informer (Proposed Rule 510). 56 F.R.D. at
234-56.
49 Proposed Rule 504 provided:
Rule 504. Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
(a) Definitions.
(1) A "patient" is a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a
psychotherapist.
(2) A "psychotherapist" is (A) a person authorized to practice medicine in any
state or nation, or reasonably believed by the patient so to be, while engaged in the
diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including drug addiction, or (B) a person licensed or certified as a psychologist under the laws of any
state or nation, while similarly engaged.
(3) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third
persons other than those present to further the interest of the patient in the consultation, examination, or interview, or persons reasonably necessary for the transmission
of the communication, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist, including members of the patient's
family.
(b) General rule of privilege. A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and
to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications, made for
the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of his mental or emotional condition, including drug addiction, among himself, his psychotherapist, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist,
including members of the patient's family.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the patient,
by his guardian or conservator, or by the personal representative of the deceased
patient. The person who was the psychotherapist may claim the privilege but only
on behalf of the patient. His authority so to do is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
(d) Exceptions.
0) Proceedingsfor hospitalization. There is no privilege under this rule for communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental
illness, if the psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined
that the patient is in need of hospitalization.
(2) Examination by order ofjudge. If the judge orders an examination of the
mental or emotional condition of the patient, communications made in the course
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law rules of privileges 50 and to freeze the privilege rules in the federal
system in order to narrow interpersonal rights and broaden governmental and institutional rights. 51
52
Even as they were being promulgated by the Supreme Court,
the rules were questioned. In his dissent to the order promulgating
the rules, 53 Justice Douglas expressed the view that the Supreme
Court lacked authority to submit proposed rules of evidence since
they were beyond "practice and procedure" as authorized by the
Rules Enabling Act. 54 Further, he felt that the rules of evidence
should be developed on a case-by-case basis by the courts or legislated by Congress. 55
The proposed rules were controversial in two major respects.
First, they raised the issue of federalism. Proposed Rule 501 would
have mandated that, in the federal courts, rules of privilege would
only be governed by the Constitution, Acts of Congress, and the Federal Rules as adopted by the Supreme Court. 5 6 Privileges created by
state law would have been ignored. 5 7 Congress resolved this controthereof are not privileged under this rule with respect to the particular purpose for
which the examination is ordered unless the judge orders otherwise.
(3) Condition an element ofc/aim or defense. There is no privilege under this rule as
to communications relevant to an issue of the mental or emotional condition of the
patient in any proceeding in which he relies upon the condition as an element of his
claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any proceeding in which any party
relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense.
56 F.R.D. at 240-41.
50 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 648.
51 Privileges which generally protect individuals were "eviscerated" or wholly omitted,
but privileges usually asserted by corporations were given "carefully widened latitude," with
the federal government given the unlimited right to keep its information out of the federal
courts. Krattenmaker, supra note 36, at 66-67.
52 The rules were first promulgated Nov. 20, 1972, pursuant to enabling statutes whereby
Congress empowered the Court to prescribe rules of "practice and procedure." 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2072, 2075 (1976); Hearings, supra note 43, at 1.
53 56 F.R.D. at 185.
54 The Rules Enabling Act specifically provides that the rules could not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
55 56 F.R.D. at 185. See Hearings, supra note 43, at 1.
56 The pertinent language states: "Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of
the United States or provided by Act of Congress, and except as provided in these rules or in
other rules adopted by the Supreme Court,....." 56 F.R.D. at 230.
57 Many in Congress, the legal community, and some members of the Judicial Conference Committee opposed this change. 119 CONG. REQ. 7643 (1973) (remarks of Rep.
Rodino);Id. at 7645 (remarks of Rep. Hungate); and Id. at 7648 (remarks of Rep. Holtzman).
The Committee of the American College of Trial Lawyers proposed a substitute rule which
would have made state law controlling on all issues of privilege except when the privileged
communication took place in federal territory: "Any claim that a witness is privileged from
testifying as to a confidential communication shall be determined in accordance with the law
of the State, District of Columbia, or territory of the United States in which the communica-
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versy by adopting a compromise. Under present Rule 501, state
privilege law controls in diversity cases, but privilege issues in other
cases will be governed by federal or state law, depending on the particular element of the claim or defense and whether state law supplies
the rule. 58
Second, the proposed rules sparked controversy concerning the
allocation of power in society. Some believed the proposed rules
gave the rights of governmental and corporate entities preeminence
over individual rights. 59 The Committee wished to restrict privileges
benefitting individuals but expand privileges for groups which it represented. 60 The proposed rules, therefore, included privileges for
trade secrets, secrets of state, and other official information.
tion occurred or from which it was transmitted."

AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS,

COMMITTEE TO STUDY PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE 26 (1970). Judge Henry Friendly of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit raised the federalism issue in testimony before the House Subcommittee. He asserted that most civil litigation is conducted in
the state courts, and the state courts have developed suitable evidentiary rules. Since those
rules affect the conduct of citizens outside the courtroom, the federal government should not
take action which would eliminate state-granted protection for communications between husband and wife, for example. Hearings, supra note 43, at 249.
58 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,supra note 7, at 654. According to Weinstein and Berger,
however, Rule 501, as adopted, requires that even in diversity cases a determination be made
whether state law supplies the rule of decision on the particular element of the claim or
defense. This is because Congress felt that applying state law in diversity cases and federal
law in federal question cases would not meet the test under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938), which Congress was seeking to incorporate. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
note 32, at 501-21. Problems of interpretation may arise as to what is an "element," whether
evidence will be admissible for one purpose but not another in cases based on federal and
state law, and which state's privilege law will apply. Id. Rule 501 as enacted made no change
in criminal practice. This is because the rule is based on Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which provided for utilization of "the principles of the common law...
in the light of reason and experience" in handling evidentiary matters, including questions of
privilege. Id. at 501-19 to 501-20; see also 120 CONG. REC. 7058 (1974).
59 Many commentators argued that the privileges afforded to government were too
broad for the executive branch. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 32, at 501-17. In
its debates, however, Congress recognized the fact that the privileges impact on the rights of
individual citizens. 119 CONG. REc. 7642-43 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Rodino); id. at 7648
(remarks of Rep. Holtzman).
60 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, upra note 7, at 687. By ignoring state-created privileges, the Committee sought to curtail use of individual privileges which it found to be "hindrances" and to enlarge governmental and corporate privileges. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, supra note 32, at 501-12. Weinstein cites three reasons for the Advisory Committee's
choice of treatment of privileges. First, by curtailing privileges, the Committee sought to
advance the policy behind the rules of admitting all relevant evidence to enhance the likelihood of accurate and just determinations. Second, if the state's interest in obtaining all relevant evidence was to be sacrificed, an overriding policy must exist. Privileges which were
incorporated in the rules either encouraged the furnishing of information (such as the required reports and identity of informer rules) or had values which were deemed meritorious.
Third, the Advisory Committee assumed that the federal interest in adoption of "sound rules
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The controversy surrounding the rules on privilege 61 prompted
Congress, for the first time, to intervene in the rule-making process.
Under the Rules Enabling Act, the proposed rules would have taken
62
effect automatically had Congress not acted within ninety days.
Congress amended the Rules Enabling Act to require its approval for
any amendment of the rules on privilege only. 63 Approval was not

required for the amendment of any other rules.
Because passage of the entire package of evidence rules was
threatened,4 Congress chose to compromise 65 and adopt present
Rule 501. This seemed to be the only rule on which everyone could
agree, since it would "leave the [flederal law of privilege where we
[the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice] found it. The [f]ederal
' 66
courts are to develop the law of privilege on a case-by-case basis.
While Rule 501 does not create a psychotherapist-patient privilege, it
is clear from the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee that Rule
501 does not proscribe the recognition of the privilege. The report
states:
It should be clearly understood that, in approving this general
rule as to privileges, the action of Congress should not be understood as disapproving any recognition of a psychiatrist-patient,
of evidence" authorized the adoption of rules which repudiate state legislative or judicial
judgment. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 32, at 501-46 to 501-57.
61 The hearsay chapter was also controversial. However, the chairman of the Subcommittee estimated that half of the complaints they received dealt with issues of privilege. 23 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 652.
62 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976). The rule gives the court the power to prescribe rules of civil
procedure. The rules were proposed under § 2072, which governs rules of civil procedure.
63 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976). Effective Jan. 2, 1975, by the addition of § 2076 concerning
rules of evidence, the Supreme Court has power to prescribe amendments to the Federal
Rules of Evidence. However, the amendment cannot take effect for 180 days after the
amendment is reported to Congress by the Chief Justice and shall not take effect "if either
house of Congress within that time shall by resolution disapprove any amendment so reported. . . ." Id. The validity of this act, however, may be questionable since the Supreme
Court has held the one-house veto unconstitutional. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
64 The outcry over Rule 501 in Congress and the press, stimulated in large measure by
the Watergate affair, may in itself have been sufficient to delay adoption of the rules and to
cause deletion of article V. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 32, at 501-17.
65 The House Judiciary Subcommittee unanimously agreed that the specific privilege
rules proposed by the Court should be eliminated and a single rule (Rule 501) substituted.
Rules of Evidence: Hearings on HR. 5463 Before the Comm. on the Judiciaiy, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974) (Senate Judiciary Committee Staff Memorandum), reprintedin 4J. BAILEY & 0. TRELLES, THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED DOCuMENTS 355, 356 (1980).
66 120 CONG. REC. 40,891 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Hungate). This standard is the same
one set forth in Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure existing at that time. 23
C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 654.
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.. .or any other of the enumerated privileges contained in the
Supreme Court rules. Rather, our action should be understood as
reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege based on a
confidential relationship and 67
other privileges should be determined on a case-by-case basis.

Congress could have chosen to enact specific rules of privilege
(such as those proposed by the Supreme Court) and thus create an

inflexible but certain body of privilege law. With specific rules, individuals could confidently divulge certain information knowing the
information would be protected in the courts.

Congress' decision to reject the proposed specific rules of privilege was essentially a rejection of a set of rules which would have
restricted individual privileges 68 in favor of a general rule which al67

S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

NEWS 7051, 7059.

68 Ste note 51 supra. The following hypothetical illustrates the inadequacy of the Proposed Rule 504, Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege:
Mr. X, who is experiencing difficulties in his marriage, asks his wife to go to a marriage
counselor. She refuses, so he goes alone. During the course of his counseling sessions, Mr. X
reveals that he and his wife have an extremely strained relationship and that he often feels
violent toward her. Mr. X also visits his family doctor and learns that he has ulcers. The
doctor prescribes medication. He tells the doctor that his marriage is on the rocks and that he
sometimes wants to hit his wife. Subsequently, Mr. X is charged with assaulting his wife.
The prosecutor seeks to compel the testimony of both the counselor and the family doctor.
Both claim, on behalf of their client and patient, that this information is privileged.
The conversations between the patient and the marriage counselor and family physician,
although expected to be confidential, would not have been privileged under Proposed Rule
504. See note 49 supra. The marriage counselor does not fit the definition of psychotherapist
under Rule 504 unless he is, or the patient reasonably believes him to be, authorized to practice medicine or licensed or certified as a psychologist. In either case, he must be engaged in
the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition. Counseling a person concerning his marriage would probably not be classified as diagnosis or treatment of a mental or
emotional illness. The family physician would be excluded from the rule because he is treating a physical condition (ulcers) and only "treating" the emotional problems incidentally, if
at all. Cf. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 32, at 504-11 (interpreting the rule to
"include the medical general practitioner who necessarily practices some form of psychotherapy in treating many of his patients").
Further, even if the communication to the marriage counselor was deemed privileged
under Proposed Rule 504, that privilege may have been waived by the patient under Rule
511 as soon as he communicated any significant part of the information to his family physician. Proposed Rule 511 reads:
A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of the
confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if he or his predecessor
while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any
significant part of the matter or communication. This rule does not apply if the
disclosure is itself a privileged communication.
56 F.R.D. at 258. Since the disclosure to his physician was voluntary and not itself a privileged communication, he would be conferred no privilege under the proposed rules. See Proposed FED. R. EVID. 511 advisory committee note, which states: "The central purpose of
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lows federal courts great flexibility in determining whether to recognize a privilege.
Some relationships lend themselves to case-by-case treatment
69
while others can best be protected by a specific privilege rule.

These approaches to privilege law need not be mutually exclusive.
Privileges with a long history of judicial recognition and widely-accepted underlying rationale could be embodied in specific rules while
others would be subject to a general rule.
The attorney-client relationship rests on a foundation of trust
and confidentiality which is essential to its effectiveness. The attorney-client privilege is relatively uncontroversial and generally accepted by the courts. Therefore, it is a good candidate for conversion
to a specific rule. This could form the basis of discussion and development of other specific rules in the future. And while proposed
Rule 504 did not adequately protect the psychotherapist-patient re70
lationship, it is quite possible to fashion a specific rule that does.
most privileges is the promotion of some interest or relationship by endowing it with a supporting secrecy or confidentiality. It is evident that the privilege should terminate when the
holder by his own act destroys this confidentiality." One wonders how requiring a psychotherapist to divulge information given to him in confidence merely because the same (or
similar) information was given to someone else promotes the relationship between the patient
and his psychotherapist. If the information is available from another source, why hinder the
relationship by requiring that the psychotherapist be the one required to divulge the
information?
69 The attorney-client and priest-penitent relationships can best be protected through a
specific rule. Privileges which are fairly recent developments in the law, such as the trade
secrets and identity of informer rules, require case-by-case treatment until the parameters of
the privilege are satisfactorily developed.
70 Rule 501 should be amended to allow federal courts to decide privilege questions "in
the light of reason and experience" except with regard to the areas of privilege addressed by
specific rules. The amended rule could be fashioned after the Proposed Rule 504 with some
modifications, as follows:
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
(a) Definitions.
(1) A "patient" is a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a
psychotherapist.
(2) A "psychotherapist" is a psychiatrist, physician, psychologist, psychotherapist or a licensed or certified counselor, or a person reasonably believed by the patient to be any of the above, while engaged in serving the patient in a counseling
capacity, including counseling for drug addiction.
(3) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third
persons other than those present to further the interest of the patient in the consultation, examination, or interview, of persons reasonably necessary for the transmission
of the communication, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist, including members of the patient's
family.
(b) General rule of privilege. A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications, made dur-
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Congress' amendment of the Rules Enabling Act to require its
approval of rules on evidentiary privileges indicates that it wanted
the opportunity to review major changes in privilege law. If the
Supreme Court desires to effect a radical alteration of privilege law,
it can submit its proposal to Congress in the form of a rule, as provided in the Rules Enabling Act. The lower federal courts, however,
do not have the option to submit proposed privilege rules to Congress. They must, therefore, effect any substantial changes they deem
necessary and leave it to the appellate process to make any needed
revisions. Courts can make less radical changes in privilege law,
however, on a case-by-case basis.7 ' The psychotherapist-patient priving the course of counseling with the psychotherapist, including counseling for drug
addiction, among himself, his psychotherapist, or persons who are participating in
the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist, including
members of the patient's family.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the patient, by
his guardian or conservator, or by the personal representative of the patient's estate
if the patient is deceased. The person who was the psychotherapist may claim the
privilege but only on behalf of the patient. His authority so to do is presumed in the
absence of evidence to the contrary.
(d) Exceptions.
(1) Proceedings for hospitalization. There is no privilege under this rule for
communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for
mental illness, if the psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment had
determined that the patient is in need of hospitalization.
(2) Examination by order ofjudge. If a judge of competent jurisdiction orders
an examination of the mental or emotional condition of the patient, communications made in the course thereof are not privileged under this rule with respect to
the particular purpose for which the examination is ordered unless the judge orders
otherwise.
(3) Condition an element of claim or defense. There is no privilege under this
rule as to communications relevant to an issue of the mental or emotional condition
of the patient in any proceeding in which he relies upon the condition as an element
of his claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any proceeding in which any
party relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense.
71 Many scholars believe, however, that because of the political nature of privileges and
the lack of accountability of judges and juries, the proper allocation of power through privileges should be determined by the legislature rather than by the judicial branch. Members of
the Committee on Privacy and Confidentiality of the California State Psychological Association reached the following conclusion:
Case law, defined as the body of decisions that have been handed down by the
courts in the process of adjudicating both civil and criminal cases, has become the
medium by which many of the rules of our society concerning confidentiality are
made; in this respect, case law has far outraced statutory law, and since case law is
made by judges and juries instead of legislators, their decisions are not directly accountable to the people through the political process. (Although many judges hold
elective, as opposed to appointive, positions, judicial elections are seldom won or lost
on the basis of specific decisions that have been handed down by the judge in
question.)
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ilege is no longer an especially controversial one, and federal courts
could recognize it without thwarting congressional intent. This
would promote substantial interests of psychotherapists, their patients, and society in general.
The federal courts as a whole, however, have not definitively
recognized the psychotherapist-patient privilege. When faced with a
claim of privilege, the individual court is left to fend for itself on a
case-by-case basis under the standards (or lack of them) set forth
under Rule 501. On the question of psychotherapist-patient privilege the approaches have been quite diverse and the results
inconsistent.
IV.

Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege Treatment in the Federal
Courts

The federal cases confronting the psychotherapist-patient privilege have approached the issue from various directions. Rule 501
provides that privileges shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts in the light of
reason and experience.
Some courts have equated the psychotherapist-patient privilege
with the physician-patient privilege and immediately dismissed the
former. United States v. Williams 72 involved proceedings to enforce a
subpoena of a psychologist's telephone message slips. The court refused to enforce the subpoena because it was overbroad. Nevertheless, it addressed the psychologist's contention that this information
was protected by a psychotherapist-patient privilege. The court said
that the psychologist-patient privilege, if one existed, would be a
form of doctor-patient privilege. Since numerous cases have held
that no doctor-patient privilege existed at common law, the court
concluded that the privilege did not apply in federal courts in the
absence of statute. 73 Although this view was dictum in Williams, two
other courts of appeals have based their holdings that a psychothera74
pist-patient privilege does not exist on identical reasoning.
A federal district court in California, in United States v. Layton ,7
Everstine, thioaey and Confdentiality in Psychotherapy, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, Sept. 1980, at 838,
col. 1. Congress' enactment of Rule 501 is nothing more than a delegation to the judicial

branch of the power to determine the validity of privileges.
72 337 F. Supp. 1114 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
73 Id. at 1115.
74 United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (1 lth Cir. 1983); United States v. Meagher,
531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976).
75 90 F.R.D. 520 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
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also interpreted Rule 501 as adhering to the common law position.
The court declined to recognize as privileged tapes of conversations
between the defendant and his psychiatrist, stating that
the psychotherapist-patient privilege is inapplicable .

. .

. [I]n

federal courts privileges are defined by reference to the common
law. See Fed. Rule Evid. 501. The federal courts have univerlaw
sally recognized that no such privilege existed at common
6
and that therefore [it] does not exist in federal courts.7
These cases fail to recognize the inherent and important differences between the physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient relationships. 77 Additionally, they interpret Rule 501 as aligned strictly
with the common law position on privileges. This assumes that enactment of Rule 501 caused privilege law to solidify, or even to return
to the position of the English common law, which recognized only
the attorney-client privilege and certain governmental privileges.
However, as the Senate report on the new federal rules clearly indicates, Congress did not intend to end the progression of privilege law
78
or to return to the common law.
In other cases, courts have been willing to consider factors other
than the common law position in reaching a decision on whether a
psychotherapist-patient privilege existed. In Lora v. Board of Education,79 the plaintiffs sought to show discriminatory conduct on the
part of the school district in its treatment of emotionally handicapped children. In deciding whether students' diagnostic and referral files were privileged, the court looked to a number of different
factors.
While the state law on privilege was not controlling, the Lora
court stated that the federal courts should recognize state privileges
where this can be done at no substantial cost to federal substantive
and procedural policy. 0 The Lora court also looked to the rejected
proposed Rule 504 for guidance:
Our opinion is strongly buttressed by consideration of Rule
504 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as promulgated by the
Supreme Court.. . . Although Rule 504, along with other spe-

cific privilege rules, was rejected by Congress in favor of the more
76 Id. at 525.
77 See notes 12-26 supra and accompanying text.
78 See text accompanying note 67 sura. For a suggestion on how to interpret the "common law" component of Rule 501, see 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5425, at
704-11.
79 74 F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
80 Id. at 576.
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general Rule 501, it still provides a useful standard from which
analysis can proceed. 8 '
The court cited the fact that proposed Rule 504 would not have protected the material sought in Lora as support for its decision that the
2
files were not privileged.
In holding that the files were not privileged, the Lora court employed a balancing test, weighing the interests for and against the
privilege. The majority of courts called upon to decide whether a
psychotherapist-patient privilege exists have taken the same approach.8 3 The Lora court noted that the privacy interest of the individual and society's interest in fostering the psychotherapist-patient
relationship supported the recognition of a privilege, but that these
had to be weighed against the "need for full development of the facts
in federal litigation in order that the paramount public interest in
8a4
the fair administration of justice be served.
It is arguable that the considerations in favor of recognition of a
psychotherapist-patient privilege so consistently outweigh the interest in getting all the evidence before the court that the privilege
ought to be generally recognized. This would eliminate the necessity
of going through the balancing process in each and every case. However, as long as Rule 501 is in force, case-by-case consideration will
be necessary. Working within this framework, the balancing approach taken by the Lora court promotes a fair resolution of privilege
questions.
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in In Re
Zuniga,8 5 analyzed the privilege in depth and applied Rule 501 in
accordance with congressional intent. The case involved consolidated appeals from decisions of two district courts. The district
courts adjudged psychiatrists Zuniga and Pierce in civil contempt for
failing to produce patient records subpoenaed by a grand jury. The
psychiatrists were allegedly involved in schemes to defraud through
billings submitted to Michigan Blue Cross-Blue Shield.8 6
The court began by recognizing the special needs of the psychi81 Id. at 584 (citation omitted).
82 Id. at 584-86.
83 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.),cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 426 (1983); United States v.
Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Witt, 542 F. Supp. 696
(S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 697 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Brown, 479 F. Supp. 1247 (D.
Md. 1979); Flora v. Hamilton, 81 F.R.D. 576 (M.D.N.C. 1978).
84 Lora, 74 F.R.D. at 578.
85 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 426 (1983).
86 For a general discussion of psychiatrists' duty to release information to insurance com-

panies, see Beigler, Pnb'ac, and Confidentiality, in

LAW AND ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF PSY-
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atric profession and deliberately avoided equating psychotherapists
with physicians. The court stated: "In both Lindstrom andMeagher in
which the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits refused to accept the privilege,
the courts simply equated it with the physician-patient privilege
without analyzing the unique aspects of the psychotherapist-patient
relationship. This court, therefore, does not find these authorities
persuasive.18 7 Instead, the Zuniga court recognized that Rule 501
gives federal courts the ability-indeed, the obligation-to participate in the continuing development of privilege law. Congress
clearly did not intend to preclude judicial recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege.88
The Zuni'a court considered the privilege law of the states (part
of the "common law" which governs privileges under Rule 501) and
the rejected Rule 504. The court noted that the states have demonstrated a willingness to recognize the privilege; and indeed a substantial number of them have adopted some form of psychotherapistpatient privilege. 89 The Zuniga court stated that although federal law
controls, the Supreme Court has taken note of state privilege laws in
determining whether to retain them in the federal system. 90
The court also focused on the legislative history of Rule 501,
including the consideration and rejection of proposed Rule 504. Although the opinion does not spell out the role of rejected Rule 504,
the court clearly viewed it as part of the "experience" in the light of
which the courts are to interpret the common law under Rule 501.91
-TheZun'ga court then balanced the societal interest in the availability of evidence to the courts against the interests promoted by a
recognition of the privilege. These included ihe individual's interest
in effective treatment and society's interests in its citizens' ability to
exercise their freedoms and in reducing the threat to safety posed by
mentally ill persons. This process of balancing the relevant interests
CHIATRY 69 (C. Hofling ed. 1981) and Chodoff, The Responsibilitiesof Ps chiatrislsto Society, in
LAW AND ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 225 (C. Hofling ed. 1981).
87 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 638.
88 See text accompanying note 67 supra.
89 See note 4 supra.
90 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 639 (quoting United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 369 n.8
(1980)).
91 Professor Wright outlined what he considered to be the proper role of the rejected
rules: "At best, the Rejected Rules provide a useful starting point for research into questions
of privilege, but it would be improper for courts to rely on them as authoritative or to incorporate them into Rule 501 without considering the criticisms of the rules that led Congress to
reject them." 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5422, at 692. The Zuniga court's
approach comports with this view.
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is fundamental to the proper application of Rule 501.92 The Zunl'a
court properly identified and executed its role in the decision-making
process on privileges. Congress likely envisioned this kind of careful
analysis and evaluation when it enacted Rule 501.
The conclusion of the court's analysis, however, may be somewhat misleading. It suggests a general recognition of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, which would have ramifications extending
beyond the facts of Zuniga. A careful reading of the opinion, however, reveals that this case leaves the law on psychotherapist-patient
privilege exactly where it found it.
According to Professors Wright and Graham, Congress, in enacting Rule 501, was clear on only two points. First, Rule 501 was
not intended to alter the pre-existing law of privilege, but rather to
leave it in its present state, whatever that might be. Second, Rule
501 was not intended to freeze the present law of privilege; it was
expected that the law would continue to be developed by the courts.
"In short, Congress restored to the courts their common law powers
with respect to privileges but without any attempt to suggest how
those powers should be exercised.

'93

The courts, then, seem to have the power to recognize privileges
not only in the limited context of particular cases, but also in a
broader context. The broader form of recognition would eliminate
the necessity of deciding the existence of the privilege in each case;
subsequent cases would need only define the scope of the privilege.
Following its consideration of the important interests promoted
by the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Zuniga court found that
"these interests, in general, outweigh the need for evidence in the
administration of criminal justice. Therefore, we conclude that a
psychotherapist-patient privilege is mandated by 'reason and experience.' -94 Since the court drew this conclusion before considering
any of the particulars of the cases on appeal, its conclusion seems not
intended to be limited to the facts of the two cases. Rather, the court
seems to have chosen to advance the proposition that the common
law includes a recognition of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 95
However, what the Zun'ga court gives-or appears to givewith one hand, it takes away with the other. The court stated:
92 See text accompanying notes 81-84 supra.
93 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5422, at 691.
94 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 639 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501). Presumably, these interests
would, in general, outweigh the need for evidence in civil matters, as well as criminal.
95 While no federal court has recognized a common law psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Supreme Court of Alaska has done so in Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976).
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"Having recognized the compelling necessity for the privilege, it remains for the Court to determine its applicability to the instant action . . .Just as the recognition ofprivileges must be undertaken on a case'96
by-case basis, so too must the scope of the privilege be considered.
The court then went on to find that the facts of the particular case
were not appropriate for application of the privilege, 97 reducing its
previous "holding" to dictum.
Even more disappointing, however, are the ramifications of the
phrase, "[j]ust as the recognition of privileges must be undertaken on
a case-by-case basis." This makes it clear that, for all its initial appearance to the contrary, this case does not depart-even in dictum-from any previous decisions. Questions of psychotherapistpatient privilege will continue to be made on a case-by-case analysis.
What the Zuniga decision does do, however, is provide an excellent
model for case-by-case analysis under Rule 501.
While the Zuniga court found that the privilege did not apply to
the facts before it, the language suggested that the court would be
likely to find actual communications between psychotherapist and
patient privileged: "The essential element of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is its assurance to the patient that his innermost
thoughts may be revealed without fear of disclosure. Mere disclosure
of the patient's identity does not negate this element."9 8
V.

Conclusion

Privileges should be afforded in cases where the interests of the
party claiming the privilege outweigh the value of the information to
the judicial system. The interests of psychotherapists, their patients,
and society are substantial enough that the psychotherapist-patient
96 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 639 (emphasis added). As the Zuniga court recognized, questions of privilege do raise two issues. First, did the communication for which the privilege is
sought occur in a relationship which merits protection? If so, then second, is recognition of a
privilege appropriate? In other words, a court must first.determine whether a privilege exists
and then whether the privilege's scope is sufficiently broad to cover the particular case.
97 The court declined to apply the privilege under the factual circumstances of Zuniga
since the information subpoenaed by the grand juries was limited to the identity of the patients, the dates of treatment, and the length of treatment on each date. 714 F.2d at 640.
Other courts have also declined to recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege to protect
information about the fact and dates of treatment. Eg., In re Doe, 711 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir.
1983); In re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1983); Flora. v. Hamilton, 81 F.R.D. 576
(M.D.N.C. 1978); Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N.Y 1977). One reason commonly cited for this is that the patient has no reasonable expectation of privacy in such information. Cf. Slovenko, supra note 14, at 187-88.
98 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 640.
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relationship merits protection. The only way to adequately protect
this relationship is through recognition of an evidentiary privilege.
The legislative history of the enactment of Rule 501 indicates
that the courts are to continue the evolution of privilege law. The
intended province of the courts includes judicial recognition of privileges so long as they are not radical departures from current privilege
law. The psychotherapist-patient privilege is relatively uncontroversial and, at the very least, ought to be recognized by the federal
courts on a case-by-case basis. An even better approach, however,
would be the enactment of a specific psychotherapist-patient privilege rule. 99
Kathleen L. Cerveny
Marianj.Kent

99 "[Rule 501] leaves the question of privilege wide open with no means of securing uniformity of treatment or providing accessible rules to follow. Both the federal courts and the
bar practicing before them need some source other than a search into the wilderness to find
5463. A Needfor Reevaluation Consistent with theJudiapplicable rules of privilege." Ladd, H..
cial Conference's Draft of the ProposedFederalRules of Evidence, 32 FED. B.J. 233, 237 (1973).

LABOR

LAW-SECTION

7

OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

ACT AND NEW JERSEY'S CASINO CONTROL ACT: WHO WILL CONTROL ORGANIZED CRIME IN ATLANTIC CITY?

In an effort to prevent the infiltration of organized crime into its
casino industry, the New Jersey legislature passed the Casino Control
Act ("Act"),' which authorized the licensing of Atlantic City hotels
for casino gambling. 2 The Act established the Casino Control Commission ("Commission") and entrusted it with broad regulatory authority over casinos and related industries. 3 Section 93 of the Act
requires annual registration with the Commission of every labor organization seeking to represent casino employees. 4 Hotel and Restaurant Employees International Union Local 54 registered pursuant
to this provision, but its chief officers were disqualified for failing to
meet the Act's qualification criteria under section 86. 5 Accordingly,
the union was prevented from collecting dues from its members, thus
6
vitiating its ability to function.
In Hotel andRestaurantEmployees InternationalUnion Local 54 v. Danziger, Local 54 sued the Commission, claiming that section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 7 which guarantees employees the right to bargain collectively through representation of
their own choosing, preempted sections 86 and 93.8 The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the decision of the New Jersey
District Court9 and held that this case fell squarely within the ruling
I New Jersey Casino Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-1 to -152 (West Supp. 1982)
[hereinafter referred to as the Act].
2 The Act contains comprehensive licensing requirements, and provides for civil and
criminal penalties for its violation or for violation of regulations promulgated under it. N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-76 to -95 (West Supp. 1982). For a discussion of the spirit and policies of
the Act, see text accompanying notes 98-112 infra.
3 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-63 to -75 (West Supp. 1982).
4 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-93(a) (West Supp. 1982). See note 20 infra and accompanying
text for a discussion of § 93.
5 Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 709 F.2d 815, 819
(3d Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 479 (1983). For a discussion of § 86 and its qualification
criteria, see note 19 in/a and accompanying text.
6 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-86 to -93(b) (West Supp. 1982); See note 20 in/a.
7 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). See part II of this comment for a discussion of the scope of § 7.
8 Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 536 F. Supp. 317
(D.N.J. 1982); see notes 25-30 inra and accompanying text.
9 709 F.2d at 833; see notes 31-34 inja and accompanying text.
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of Hill v. Florida. 0 In Hill, the United States Supreme Court stated

that no conditions may be imposed on employees' choice of bargaining representatives.I Judge Becker vehemently dissented saying that
the New Jersey statute in question fell within an exception delineated
by the Court since Hill: that of a deeply-seeded local interest.' 2 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether section 7 of
the NLRA preempts state regulations such as sections 86 and 93, in
13
the area of union representation.
Part I of this comment relates the relevant facts of the Danziger
controversy. 14 Part II examines section 7 of the NLRA and relevant
Supreme Court preemption decisions from Hill to the present.' 5 Part
III applies preemption analysis to the facts of Danger, and argues
that the Casino Control Act does not unconstitutionally interfere
6
with federal labor legislation.'
I.

The Challenge to the Casino Control Act

In 1977, the New Jersey legislature enacted the Casino Control
Act, legalizing casino gambling in Atlantic City. 17 The Act requires

the licensing of casino employees, including those who perform custodial or service-related duties not directly related to casino operations. 18 Section 86 of the Act lists criteria for the disqualification of
casino licensees, 19 while section 93 requires registration of labor orga10

325 U.S. 538 (1945). See notes 46-50 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of

the Hill opinion.
11 325 U.S. at 543; see notes 46-50 infra and accompanying text.
12 709 F.2d at 846-51; see notes 65-86 infra and accompanying text (setting forth the
Supreme Court decisions since Hill which allow for limited flexibility in construing § 7 of the

NLRA).
13 Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 709 F.2d 815 (3d
Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 479 (1983).

14 See notes 17-35 incfa and accompanying text.
15 See notes 36-86 infta and accompanying text.
16 See notes 87-145 infra and accompanying text.
17 New Jersey Casino Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-1 to -152 (West Supp. 1982).
18 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-89 to -91 (West Supp. 1982). Through the licensing mechanism the various state agencies govern union qualification and thus guard against organized
crime.
19 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-86 (West Supp. 1982). Section 86 disqualifications include 1)
intentional failures to disclose material information; (2) enumerated criminal convictions;
(3) other criminal convictions which are inimical to casino operations; (4) current or pending
prosecutions for enumerated crimes; (5) engaging in crime for occupational purposes; (6)
career offenders and certain of their associates; (7) conduct which, whether prosecuted or not,
would constitute an enumerated offense; and (8) defiance of any official investigatory body
concerned with crimes relating to gaming, official corruption, or organized crime activity.
Although § 86 criteria are broad, each is concerned solely with corruption and organized
crime as these relate to the casino industry.
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nizations seeking to represent casino employees, and prohibits dues
collection by any union whose officers, agents, or principal employees
are disqualified under section 86.20 The Commission is, however,
given the discretion to waive disqualification criteria if such waiver is
required by the interests of justice and furthers the policy of the
2
Act. '
Local 54, a National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") certified
labor organization representing upwards of 12,000 hotel and restaurant employees, registered in accordance with the Act.2 2 Thereafter,
the Division of Gaming Enforcement ("Division") investigated the
union and its chief officers, and reported to the Casino Control Com23
mission regarding the qualifications of Local 54's chief officers.
The Division reported that in its view Frank Gerace, President, Robert Sumino, Secretary-Treasurer, and Frank Materio, Grievance
Manager, were disqualified under section 86 of the Act because of
24
criminal convictions and associations.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-93 (West Supp. 1982). Section 93 provides in pertinent part:
a. Each labor organization, union or affiliate seeking to represent employees licensed or registered under this act and employed by a casino hotel or a casino licensee shall register with the commission annually, and shall disclose such information
to the commission as the commission may require, including the names of all affiliated organizations, pension and welfare systems and all officers and agents of such
organizations and systems. . .. The commission may in its discretion exempt any
labor organization, union, or affiliate from the registration requirements of this subsection where the commission finds that such organization, union or affiliation is not
the certified bargaining representative of any employee.
b. No labor organization, union or affiliate registered or required to be registered
pursuant to this section and representing or seeking to represent employees licensed
or registered under this act may receive any dues from any employee licensed or
registered under this act and employed by a casino licensee or its agent, or administer any pension or welfare funds, if any officer, agent, or principal employee of the
labor organization, union or affiliate is disqualified in accordance with the criteria,
contained in section 86 of this Act. The commission may for the purposes of this
subsection waive any disqualification criterion consistent with the public policy of
this act and upon a finding that the interests ofjustice so require.
c. Neither a labor organization, union or affiliate nor its officers and agents not
otherwise individually licensed or registered under this act and employed by a casino licensee may hold any financial interest whatsoever in the casino hotel or casino
licensee whose employees they represent.
21 Id. Section 93(b) of the Act confers upon the Commissioner discretionary authority to
"waive any disqualification criteria [of § 86] consistent with the public policy of this act and
upon a finding that the interests of justice so require." Se note 20 supra. Moreover, the
Commission may fashion a sanction which is of lesser magnitude than those explicitly provided for in § 93. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-75.
22 709 F.2d at 817.
23 Id. at 819.
24 Id. Section 76 of the Act entitles the Division to investigate all applicants and provide
the Commission with all information necessary for a proceeding involving enforcement of any
20
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The Commission scheduled a hearing to discuss the Division's
allegations for September 9, 1981.25 Prior to this date, however, Local 54 filed a complaint and motion for a preliminary injunction in
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Local
54 claimed that section 93 of the Casino Control Act was preempted
by federal legislation and that the union would suffer irreparable
harm if the matter proceeded to a hearing on the merits. 26 The dis27
trict court denied the union's motion for a preliminary injunction.
While appeals and cross-appeals were pending, the Commission commenced its hearings and issued a final decision, disqualifying three
officers: Gerace and Materio because of their associations with organized crime, and business agent Karlos LaSane because of his
criminal record. 28 The Commission ordered the officers removed
from their union offices by October 12, 1982; otherwise, Local 54
29
would thereafter be prohibited from collecting membership dues.
On October 12, 1982, Judge Brotman, for the district court, enjoined the Commission from taking any steps to enforce its order
against Local 54 and its officers. 30 From Judge Brotman's original
decision, the parties then filed a joint appeal with the court of appeals. 3' The majority found the union's claims meritorious and reversed the district court's denial of preliminary injunctive relief,
remanding the matter for entry of an order enjoining enforcement of
section 93.32 Judge Becker dissented, saying that section 7 of the
regulations of the Act. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-76 (West Supp. 1982); see note 28 infra and
accompanying text.
25 709 F.2d at 819. Section 66 of the Act vests power in the Commission to conduct
investigative hearings. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-66 (West Supp. 1982).

26

Daaiger,536 F. Supp. 317, 321, 332 (D.NJ. 1982). The union instituted the action for

declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against prohibitions in the Act. The district
court denied relief, stating that the union was not likely to succeed on the merits of the claim
that the Act was invalidated by the supremacy clause. Furthermore, the union was not likely
to succeed on merits of vagueness and overbreadth claims under the first and fourteenth
amendments.

27 Id. at 338.
28 709 F.2d at 820, 821. Frank Gerace and Frank Materio were disqualified pursuant to
§ 86() of the Act for their association with a career offender cartel, which created a reasonable belief that the association was inimical to the policy of the Act. Karlos LaSane was
disqualified under § 86(c) of the Act because of his criminal conviction on extortion charges
while he was City Commissioner in 1973.
29 709 F.2d at 821. The Commission is given the power to make such a removal pursuant
to § 93(b) of the Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-93(b) (West Supp. 1982). See note 20 supra for
the text of § 93(b).
30 Judge Brotman's injunction against the enforcement of the dues collection prohibition
is discussed at 709 F.2d at 821.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 833; see text accompanying notes 87-89 inra.
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NLRA did not preclude New Jersey from statutorily restricting
union representation of employees in the casino industry. Judge
Becker found that the state's interest in prohibiting the infiltration of
organized crime into Atlantic City outweighed any preemptive considerations. 33 The Third Circuit en banc denied a petition for rehearing, stating that the issue of whether the NLRA preempted
sections 86 and 93 of the Casino Control Act was worthy of full exploration by the Supreme Court.34 On November 28, 1983, the
35
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
II.

The Scope of Section 7

36
A key concern of the states is whether section 7 of the NLRA
occupies the entire field in the area of qualification of union officials,
or whether certain limited state regulations, such as sections 86 and
93 of the Casino Control Act,3 7 can coexist with the federal law. An
analysis of this issue must begin with Congress' enactment of section
7.
In the Wagner Act of 1935 ("NLRA"),38 Congress established a
permanent foundation for the right of employees to organize and
bargain collectively through representation of their choice.3 9 The
heart of the Wagner Act was section 7, which provided:
33 Id. at 835; see text accompanying notes 122-25 infra.
34 113 L.R.R.M.(BNA) 3311 (3d Cir. 1983). The court noted that given the magnitude
of a state's interest in regulating an industry such as the casino industry, and the contention
that such regulation does not inexorably stand as an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of
Congress in the labor area, the issue of whether the NLRA preempts a provision such as
section 93 of the Casino Control Act would seem a question worthy of full exploration by the
Supreme Court.
35 Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 709 F.2d 815 (3d
Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 479 (1983).
36 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). See text accompanying note 40 inf/a for the language of§ 7 as
orginally enacted, and see the text accompanying notes 53 and 54 in/ra for the Taft-Hartley
amendments to § 7.
37 See notes 1, 19, and 20 supra and accompanying text.
38 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. 151 (1976)).
39 Section 7 borrowed heavily from § 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA), Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 198 (1933), which in turn borrowed heavily from the
Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926). The Supreme Court changed the course of labor
relations when it upheld the constitutionality of the Railway Labor Act in Texas &N.O.R.Z v.
BrotherhoodofRy. &S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930). Texas &N.O.RR. effectively overruled
Adairv. UnitedStates, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), which held that state law interference with employees' efforts to organize and choose bargaining representatives was largely beyond the reach of
federal legislation. Both the Railway Labor Act and the NIRA lacked the effective enforcement mechanism which the NLRA contains in §§ 8-10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158-160 (1976).
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Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representation of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection. 4°
The rights guaranteed in section 7 are implemented and enforced
through section 8 of the NLRA, 4 1 which makes a section 7 violation
an unfair labor practice. 4 2 The Act explicitly refers to both employers and unions43 but does not purport to govern the qualifications of
those who may become union officials. 44 On its face the NLRA does
not disable states from legislating the qualifications for eligibility as a
bargaining representative. Moreover, because there was little discussion of section 7's preemptive effect, the legislative history of the
45
NLRA offers little insight into congressional intent on this issue.
40 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
41 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976). Section 8(a) contains the provision enforcing an employee's
rights as follows:
Sec. 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7;
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization or contribute financial or other support to it...;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or any term or condition of employment
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. .. ;
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has
filed charges or given testimony under this Act;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 9(a).
42 Id
43 Unfair labor practices committed by employers are governed by § 8(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (1976), as set forth in note 41 supra. Unfair labor practices committed by unions are
governed by § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976). Section 8(b) prohibits labor organizations
from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights; from causing an
employer to discriminate against an employee; from refusing to bargain with an employer;
from engaging in illegal strikes; from charging excessive dues; from extorting payment from
an employer; and from engaging in illegal picketing.
44 The NLRA is silent as to qualifications of union officials. Congress has, however, addressed this problem. See notes 58-64 in/a, and accompanying text for a discussion of
§ 504(a) of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
45 During the congressional debate over the Wagner Act, the only mention of a conflict
between federal and state regulations was an objection that the Act would violate the tenth
amendment. HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 24344, 840 (1935) (statement of James A. Emery, General Counsel, National Association of Manufacturers). In order to violate the tenth amendment, the federal legislation would have to
enter an area reserved solely for the states. Therefore, the rejection of the tenth amendment
objection sheds little light on whether state legislation can coexist with the Act. In addition,
several objections to the Act's failure to deal with the influence of racketeering on the labor
movement were made. Hearings on S 2926 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 606-07, 645-46, 745-52, 979 (1934) (statements of Wallace B. Donham, Dean,
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The United States Supreme Court faced the task of ascertaining
the breadth of section 7 in Hill v. Florida.46 The Florida legislature
had enacted a statute providing that no person who has not been a
citizen of the United States for more than ten years, who has been
convicted of a felony, or who is not a person of good moral character
shall be licensed as a business agent of a labor union.4 7 A union with
48
an unlicensed business agent was prevented from collecting dues.
The Court, speaking expansively, stated that employees were to have
"full freedom"149 to choose their own representatives, and held that
50
section 7 of the NLRA preempted the Florida enactment.
In 1947, Congress, through the Taft-Hartley Act ("LMRA"), 5'
substantially revised the NLRA. 52 Section 7 was reenacted in basiHarvard Business College; Howard Goodman, Manager, Goodman Manufacturing Co.;
Charles R. Hook, Pres., American Rolling Mill Co.; William F. Dunne, Member, National
Committee of the Trade Union Unity League). Congress' ultimate failure to deal with these
problems in the Wagner Act does not necessarily foreclose the states from acting. Rather, an
equally plausible theory is that Congress felt that control of racketeering was better left to the
states.
46 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
47 FLA.STAT. § 481.04 (1949); see a/so Hill v. State, 155 Fla. 245, 247, 19 So. 2d 857, 858
(1944), where the Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute on the
ground that § 4 was a valid exercise of the state police power.
48 325 U.S. at 541. Hill was enjoined from acting as the union's business agent until he
obtained a license, and the union was enjoined from operating until it made a report and
paid the fee to the Secretary of State. Hill, 155 Fla. at 248, 19 So. 2d at 858.
49 325 U.S. at 541. Justice Black took the "full freedom" language from § 1 of the Wagner Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). See text accompanying note 135 infha for the text of § 1.
50 325 U.S. at 543.
The declared purpose of the Wagner Act, as shown in its first section, is to
encourage collective bargaining, and to protect the "full freedom" of workers in the
selection of bargaining representatives of their own choice. To this end Congress
made it illegal for an employer to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in
selecting their representatives. Congress attached no conditions whatsoever to their
freedom of choice in this respect. Their own best judgment, not that of someone
else, was to be their guide. 'Full freedom' to choose an agent means freedom to pass
upon that agent's qualifications.
Section 4 of the Florida Act circumicribes the 'full freedom' of choice which
Congress said employees should possess. It does this by requiring a "business agent"
to prove to the satisfaction of a Florida Board that he measures up to standards set
by the State of Florida as one who, among other things, performs the exact function
of a collective bargaining representative. To the extent that § 4 limits a union's
choice of such an "agent" or bargaining representative, it substitutes Florida's judgment for the workers' judgment.
Id. at 541. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Roberts, dissented, finding that the federal
and state legislation could coexist in the area and that this was a valid exercise of the state
police power. 325 U.S. 538, 547-561 (Frankfurter J., dissenting).
51 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, ch. 120, 61
Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976)).
52 By 1947 the labor movement achieved great power, albeit unevenly distributed. One
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cally the same form as it had been in the Wagner Act, but additionally allowed employees the rights to refrain from organizing,
bargaining collectively, and engaging in concerted activities, except
to the extent that these rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized under section 8(a)(3). 53 Section 7, as
reenacted, still contained no explicit language either precluding or
inviting state regulation of the qualification of union officials. 54 Two
sections of the 1947 amendments to the NLRA, however, explicitly
allowed for state action in particular areas, 55 while another section
explicitly prohibited it.56 Because the Taft-Hartley Act contains secauthor wrote that "the trade unions are the most powerful economic organizations in the
community- in fact, they are the most powerful economic organizations which the community has ever seen." S. SLICHTER, THE CHALLENGE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1947). The
Taft-Hartley Act was an effort to curb unions' abuses of the power they had obtained. The
bill was bitterly opposed by organized labor and was vetoed by President Truman, yet passed
over his veto. For an excellent discussion, see Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Aanagement Relations Act, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1-49, 274-315 (1947-48). It is interesting to note that a major
impetus of the Taft-Hartley Amendments was that some so-called "labor unions" had become primarily corrupt rackets. See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 84-85 (9th
ed. 1981).
53 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). Section 8(a)(3) allows an employer to agree with a union that
new employees, as a condition of employment, become members of the union, subject to
certain limitations. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976); see also note 55 infra.
54 Neither § 7 nor the rest of the NLRA as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act addressed
state or federal legislation of union qualifications. But see notes 58-64 infa and accompanying
text.
55 Section 10(a) gave the NLRB restricted power to cede jurisdiction to state agencies,
thus eliminating the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction over labor disputes. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a)
(1976). Section 14(b) granted the states the right to prohibit mandatory membership in a
union as a condition of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1976).
In pertinent part, section 10(a) reads:
The Board is empowered . . . to prevent any person from engaging in any
unfair labor practice (listed in section 158 of this title) affecting commerce. This
power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has
been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise: Provided, That the
Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any State or Territory to cede
to such agencyjurisdictionover any cases in any industy (other than mining, manufacturing, communications, and transportation except where predominantly local in character) even though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, unless the
provision of the State or Territorial statute applicable to the determination of such
cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this subchapter or has received a construction inconsistent therewith. (emphasis added)
Moreover, section 14(b) reads:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or
application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application
is prohibited by State or Territorial law.
56 Section 14(a) allows supervisors to become members of unions, but does not compel
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tions explicitly granting the states the power to regulate in some areas and sections denying them the right in other areas, the absence of
any preemptive language in section 7 is not dispositive of the issue in
57
either direction.
Congress again turned its attention to labor legislation with the
enactment of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959 (LMRDA).5 8 Congress drafted section 504 of the LMRDA
59
to combat the infiltration of criminal elements into labor unions.
Section 504(a) prohibits individuals convicted of certain felonies
60
from holding a union office for five years following the conviction,
thus limiting the employee's "free choice" of a bargaining representative.6 ' Section 504 does not indicate whether it is the sole qualification statute or whether states also have the right to regulate in this
employers to deem their supervisors as employees for the purposes of any law relating to
collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976).
57 See notes 55 and 56 supra. If the Taft-Hartley Act contained only provisions which
expressly precluded state action, one could possibly infer that if a section did not mention
state action, that it was permitted. Likewise if the Act contained only provisions which allowed state action, then when a section was silent one could possibly infer that state action
was precluded. When, however, as happens in the Taft-Hartley Act, both types are present,
no clear inference can be drawn from a section's silence.
58 Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1976)).
59 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1976). In relevant part, § 504 provides:
(a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist Party or who has
been convicted of, or served any part of a prison term resulting from his conviction
of robbery, bribery, extortion, embezzlement, grand larceny, burglary, arson, violation of narcotics laws, murder, rape, assault with intent to kill, assault which inflicts
grievous bodily injury, or a violation of title II or III of this Act, or conspiracy to
commit any such crimes, shall serve(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar
governing body, business agent, manager, organizer, or other employee (other than
as an employee performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any group or
association of employers dealing with any labor organization, or
(2) as a labor relations consultant to a person engaged in an industry or activity
affecting commerce, or as an officer, director, agent, or employee (other than as an
employee performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any group or association of employers dealing with any labor organization, during or for five years after
the termination of his membership in the Communist Party, or for five years after
such conviction or after the end of such imprisonment. ...
(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
(c) For the purposes of this section, any person shall be deemed to have been
"convicted" and under the disability of "conviction" from the date of the judgment
of the trial court or the date of the final sustaining'of such judgment on appeal,
whichever is the later event, regardless of whether such conviction occurred before
or after the date of enactment of this Act.
60 Id. Section 504 applies even when the conviction occurred before the date of the enactment. 29 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1976).
61 Id. Thus, even though employees have the "right. . .to representation of their own
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area.62 Like the Taft-Hartley Act, the LMRDA contains a section
expressly precluding certain state action and sections expressly allowing certain state action. 63 Therefore, Congress' silence in section
64
504 is also not dispositive of its preemptive effect.
In 1960, the Supreme Court considered a conflict between.section 7 and a state regulation targeted toward a single industry. In
De Veau v. Braisled,65 section 8 of the New York Waterfront Commission Act 66 was challenged as an unconstitutional usurpation of congressional power.
The New York statute disqualified persons

convicted of certain crimes from eligibility for office in any waterfront union. 67 DeVeau presented the Court with a unique factual sitchoosing," see text accompanying note 40 supra, they may not choose a representative disqualified under the § 504(a) criteria.
62 See note 59 supra for the text of § 504.
63 Sections 603(a), 29 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1976), and 604, 29 U.S.C. § 524 (1976), expressly
grant the states regulatory freedom. Section 603(a) permits states to regulate in the areas of
labor organization reponsibilities, rights, and liabilities. Section 604 recognizes the rights of
states to enact and enforce criminal laws.
Conversely, § 483 expressly restricts state action, providing:
No labor organization shall be required by law to conduct elections of officers with
greater frequency or in a different form or manner than is required by its own constitution or bylaws, except as otherwise provided by this subchapter. Existing rights
and remedies to enforce the constitution and bylaws of a labor organization with
respect to elections prior to the conduct thereof shall not be affected by the provisions of this subchapter. The remedy provided by this subchapter for challenging
an election already conducted shall be exclusive.
29 U.S.C. § 483 (1976).
64 The dissent in Danziger espoused this position. See notes 122-25 infra and accompanying text.
65 363 U.S. 144 (1960). Justice Frankfurter wrote a plurality opinion, joined by Justices
Clark, Whittaker, and Stewart. Justice Brennan provided the necessary fifth vote in his concurring opinion. Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Black, arguing that the New York law should be struck down under Hill v. Florida,
363 U.S. 144, 161 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan participated in neither the consideration nor decision of the case.
66 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 9933 (McKinney 1974). Section 8 provides:
No person shall solicit, collect or receive any dues, assessments, levies, fines or contributions, or other charges within the state for or on behalf of any labor organization
which represents employees registered or licensed pursuant to the provisions of this
act . . .if any officer, agent or employee of such labor organization . . .has been
convicted by a court of the United States, or any state or territory thereof, of a
felony [or] any misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. . . unless he has been subsequently pardoned therefor by the governor or other appropriate authority of the
state or jurisdiction in which such conviction was had or has received a certificate of
good conduct from the board of parole pursuant to the provisions of the executive
law to remove the disability.
67 The appellant in DeVeau had served as Secretary-Treasurer of Local 1346, International Longshoreman's Association. In 1920 he pled guilty to grand larceny and received a
suspended sentence. Three years after the enactment of the Waterfront Commission Act,
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uation because section 8 was enacted pursuant to a congressionally
68
approved interstate compact between New York and New Jersey.
Although the compact received congressional support, section 8, administered solely by New York, was not itself specifically approved. 69
Justice Brennan, who provided the fifth vote in a plurality opinion,
stated that Congress had demonstrated its intent that section 8 of the
New York Waterfront Commission Act should stand, and found no
preemption.7 0 He further added that the LMRDA, 7 1 containing lan-

guage barring convicted felons from holding union office, 72 did not
displace additional legislation by the states.7 3 Thus, this Court recognized a limited exception to Hill in the unique factual setting of
De Veau.
In addition to the limited exception to Hill carved out in DeVeau, the Supreme Court has, through a series of cases, delineated a
general exception to the normal rules of preemption in the labor
area. In San Diego Building Trades Council,Millmen's Union, Local 202 v.
Garmon, 74 the Court enunciated what has become the recognized rule
appellee informed Local 1346 that the local was prohibited from collecting dues as long as
appellant remained in office. Appellant was removed from office and brought an action seeking declaratory judgment that section 8, see note 66 supra, was unconstitutional. The New
York Court of Appeals ultimately held that this New York law was a valid exercise of the
state's police power and not preempted by section 7 of the NLRA. 5 N.Y.2d 236, 157 N.E.2d
165 (1959).
68 Congress had approved this compact pursuant to article I, section 10 of the U.S. Constitution in the Waterfront Commission Compact, Pub. L. No. 83-252, 67 STAT. 541 (1953).
69 Section 8 is part of New York's code. It was enacted by New York and is administered
solely by New York, thus it lacks the bi-state character which would require congressional
approval pursuant to article I, section 10, of the U.S. Constitution and, accordingly, was not
formally included in the compact which Congress approved. DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 150-51.
70 Justice Brennan opined that Congress has demonstrated its intent that § 8 of the New
York Waterfront Commission Act should stand, despite the provisions of the NLRA. He
additionally believed that the LMRDA explicitly provides that it shall not displace state
legislation. New York's disqualification of ex-felons from waterfront union offices, on all the
circumstances, and as applied to this specific area, is a reasonable means for achieving a
legitimate state aim, and does not deny due process or otherwise violate the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, he held that the judgment should be affirmed. 363 U.S. at 160 (Brennan,
J., concurring).
71 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1976); see text accompanying notes 58-61 supra.
72 See note 59 supra.
73 See note 70 supra. However, the dissenting Justices believed that Congress' failure to
overrule Hill indicated congressional approval of Hill and that federal law alone should determine the qualifications for union officials. 363 U.S. at 165. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
74 359 U.S. 236 (1959). Garmon involved an action in state court by an employer against
a union for an injunction to restrain picketing and for damages. In an opinion by Justice
Frankfurter, the Court held that §§ 7 and 8 of the NLRA preempted the state action, and
that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter, reversing the decision of the California Supreme Court that the action was not under the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.
Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1958). Justice
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in the area of preemption and labor legislation:
[D]ue regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal
system . .. has required us not to find withdrawal from the

states of power to regulate where the activity regulated was a
merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations
Act. Or where the regulated conduct touched interests so deepy
rooted in localfeeling and responsibility that, in the absence of com-

pelling congressional direction, we could not75infer that Congress
had deprived the states of the power to act.

However, the Cannon Court added that in instances where the activities which a state purports to regulate are protected by section 7 of
the NLRA, or constitute an unfair labor practice under section 8,
due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction
yield. 76 This statement created conflict, because a state regulation
could touch interests deeply rooted in local feeling while at the same
time be "fairly assumed to be protected by Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act. ' 77 Later decisions of the Court, most notably
79
Farmerv. Carpenters,78 have removed this conflict.
In Farmer, the Court stated that regulations which touch interests deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility are an exception
to the general rule stated in Garmon .80 The Court found that a state's
interest in allowing an action for intentional infliction of emotional
Harlan, joined by Justices Clark, Whittaker, and Stewart, filed a concurring opinion emphasizing that "where the challenged conduct is neither protected nor prohibited under the federal Act," state regulation and power is not precluded. 359 U.S. at 254 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
75 359 U.S. at 243-44 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
76 Id. at 244; see also note 77 infra.
77 Justice Frankfurter stated: "When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment
requires that state jurisdiction must yield." 359 U.S. at 244. See also note 74 supra for a
discussion of the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan.
78 Farmer, Special Adm'r v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
79 See note 80 infra and accompanying text.
80 Writing the unanimous decision, Justice Powell stated:
We have refused to apply the pre-emption doctrine to activity that otherwise would
fall within the scope of Garmon if that activity 'was a merely peripheral concern of
the Labor Management Relations Act. . .[or] touched interests so deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to
act.' 359 U.S. at 243-44.. . . These exceptions 'in no way undermine the vitality
of the pre-emption rule.' 386 U.S. at 180. To the contrary, they highlight our responsibility in a case of this kind to determine the scope of the general rule by
examining the state interests in regulating the conduct in question and the potential
for interference with the federal regulatory scheme.
430 U.S. at 296-97.
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distress against union officials by a union member outweighed any
interest the NLRB had in having exclusive control over the same
matter, and therefore the state action was not preempted by the
NLRA.8 ' The opinion of Local 926, InternationalUnion of OperatingEngineers v. Jones, 2 augmented the decision in Farmer, identifying the
analysis for determining whether a state regulation should stand:
The question of whether regulation should be allowed because of
the deeply-rooted nature of the local interest involves a sensitive
balancing of any harm to the regulatory scheme established by
Congress, either in terms of negating the Board's exclusive jurisdiction or in terms of conflicting substantive rules, and the imcause of action to the state as a
portance of the asserted
83
protection to its citizens.

The Supreme Court, in both Farmer andjones, recognized an exception to the general preemption rule outlined in Garmon. Application
of the "local interest" exception can only be determined by balancing a special state interest against the conflicting federal concern of
84
maintaining a uniform regulatory scheme in the area of labor law.
NeitherJones nor any other relevant Supreme Court decision
has overruled Hill. However, later Supreme Court decisions have
modified and limited the breadth of its words. Deeau instructs that
not all state regulation concerning qualifications of union officials is
preempted under the doctrine of Hill.85 Instead, any challenged
state regulation which appears to conflict with section 7 of the
81 430 U.S. at 302-04. The Court vacated the judgment of the California Court of Appeals which had held that the conduct was arguably subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB
and therefore preempted. Garmon, 49 Cal. App. 3d 614, 122 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1975). The
California Court of Appeals reversed ajury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, 49 Cal. App. 3d at
614, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 722, and the California Supreme Court declined to review the case.
430 U.S. at 295.
82 103 S. Ct. 1453 (1983). The Court held that appellee's state cause of action for interference with contractual relations, premised on an allegation that appellant union had coerced the employer into breaching the contract, was preempted by §§ 7 and 8 of the NLRA.
Appellee had previously filed a charge with the NLRB, alleging that appellant union had
procured his discharge because he was not a member in good standing with the union. When
the NLRB rejected this charge, rather than appeal to the NLRB's General Counsel, appellee
filed suit in a Georgia state court. The Superior Court, Fulton County, Georgia (unreported
opinion), dismissed the complaint on the ground that it was preempted because the subject
matter was arguably within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. See 159 Ga. App. 693,
285 S.E.2d 30 0981). The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal on the grounds
that Georgia had a deeply rooted local interest and that the controversy presented in state
court was not identical to that which would be presented to the NLRB. 285 S.E.2d at 32-33.
83 103 S. Ct. at 1459. The balancing in this case favored protection of the federal labor
scheme.
84 See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
85 See notes 65-73 sura and accompanying text.
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NLRA triggers a balancing test: to determine if the state regulation
can coexist with section 7, a court must weigh, as outlined in Jones,
the special state interest against the harm to the federal regulatory
86
scheme.
III.

The Danzz'ger Analysis

The majority opinion in Danziger, relying heavily on Hill and
Congress' subsequent failure to legislatively overrule Hill, fashioned
a preemption doctrine that appears to leave no room for state regula87
tion of qualifications for union officials.
Choice of bargaining representative is totally protected by section 7, except to the extent that the bargaining representative
may be disqualified under Section 504(a) of the LMRDA. 88 No
Section 504 LMRDA disqualification applies to [Local 54's] officers. Thus there is neither occasion nor justification for engaging in weighing or balancing. 89
The Danziger court, by employing this absolute preemption doctrine and refusing to examine the purposes and policies of the federal
scheme in comparison with the state interest in this regulation has, in
effect, denied the existence of an exception to the general preemption
rule which the Supreme Court has recognized in cases such as Farmer
andJones. 9° In Jones, the Court found the union's conduct arguably
prohibited by section 8(b)(1)(B) of the NLRA, 9' which forbids a labor union to coerce an employer in the choice of his representative
92
for purposes of collective bargaining or adjustment of grievances.
Similarly, the Danziger court found that the employee's free choice of
a bargaining representative is arguably protected by section 7.93 In
Jones, however, the Supreme Court additionally checked for exceptions, by first ascertaining whether the issue was merely a peripheral
concern of the Act, 94 and then balancing the state interest against the
86 See notes 80-84 supra and accompanying text.
87 709 F.2d at 835 (Becker, J., dissenting); see also text accompanying note 88 infra.
88 See notes 58-64 supra and accompanying text for discussion of § 504(a).
89 709 F.2d at 828.
90 See notes 80-84 supra and accompanying text.
91 103 S. Ct. at 1460-61.
92 Section 8(b)(1)(B) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents to restrain or coerce an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes
of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(1) (B) (1976).
93 709 F.2d at 828.
94 103 S. Ct. at 1459-60. If the conduct at issue is only a peripheral concern of the Act or
touches on interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of
compelling congressional direction, it could not be inferred that Congress intended to deprive
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harm to the federal regulatory scheme. 95 TheJones Court found an
obvious and substantial interference with the NLRB's jurisdiction
which outweighed any deeply rooted interest the state had in the
matter.9 6 Regardless of which way the scale would have tipped, the
97
Danziger majority erred by not using the balancing test at all.
A.

New Jerseq's State Interest

The balancing must begin with New Jersey's interest in maintaining a comprehensive regulatory scheme to govern casino gambling. 98 In 1974, the New Jersey voters, aware of organized crime's
attraction to casino gambling, soundly defeated a state-wide referendum to legalize gambling in Atlantic City.9 9 A second referendum
passed in 1976,100 only when the voters were assured that New Jersey
the state of the power to act, the Supreme Court will refuse to invalidate the state regulation
or sanction the conduct.
95 See text accompanying note 83 supra for a formulation of the balancing test.
96 103 S. Ct. at 1462.
We thus cannot agree that Jones' efforts to recover damages from the Union for
interference with his contractual relationships with his employer was of only a peripheral concern to the federal labor policy. Our [past] decisions. . . refute Jones'
submission. They also foreclose any claim that Jones' action against the Union for
interference with his job is so deeply rooted in local law that Georgia's interest in
enforcing that law overrides the interference with the federal labor law that prosecution of the state action would entail.
Id.
97 709 F.2d at 828. The Daneiger Court specifically stated that it did not and need not
apply the balancing test. Id. It appears beyond dispute, however, that balancing is required.
See text accompanying note 83 supra.
98 See notes 100-06 infra and accompanying text.
99 Sullivan,Jersq, Refiets Cas'ino Proposal, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1974, at 1, col. 3. A large
turnout led to the defeat of the gambling question by a vote of 1,851,154 to 671,685.
100 The referendum passed read as follows:
It shall be lawful for the Legislature to authorize by law the establishment and
operation, under regulation and control by the State, of gambling houses or casinos
within the boundaries, as heretofore established, of the city of Atlantic City, county
of Atlantic, and to license and tax such operations and equipment used in connection therewith. Any law authorizing the establishment and operation of such gambling establishments shall provide for the State revenues derived therefrom to be
applied solely for the purpose of providing reductions in property taxes, rentals,
telephone, gas, electric, and municipal utilities charges of eligible senior citizens and
disabled residents of the State, in accordance with such formulae as the Legislature
shall by law provide. The type and number of such casinos or gambling houses and
of the gambling games which may be conducted in any such establishment shall be
determined by or pursuant to the terms of the law authorizing the establishment
and operation thereof.
NJ. CONsT. art. IV, § 7, para. 2D (1947, amended 1976). The constitutionality of the Casino
Control Act was upheld in Young v. Byrne, 144 N.J. Super. 10, 21, 364 A.2d 47, 53 (L. Div.
1976).
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would have "the strongest regulations of casinos in the world."' 0' To
keep its promise to the voters, the state had to prevent organized
crime from infiltrating its gambling industry, an industry the FBI
labelled "the lifeblood of organized crime."' 1 2 Legalized casino gambling attracts organized crime because casinos contain vast amounts
of cash and gaming chips susceptible to misappropriation, and because millions of dollars continually change hands among thousands
of people on the casino floor without any record showing where or
10 3
from whom the money came.
The unique characteristics of the gambling industry, along with
its other potential societal evils, 0 4 compelled the New Jersey legislature and various state agencies to extensively investigate ways to keep
Atlantic City's gambling industry clean, 0 5 aware that only the most
stringent of gambling control laws would thwart the infiltration of
the casinos and related services by organized crime.' 0 6 The State
Commission of Investigation explicitly recognized the necessity of
state control over casino-related labor unions, asserting that "there
are few better vehicles utilized by organized crime to gain a stranglehold on an entire industry than labor racketeering."' 0 7 The reasons
for this assertion are three-fold. First, organized labor sits in an ideal
position to extort money from casino owners for labor peace. Be101 See, e.g., Strongest Law in the World O eredfor Atlantic City Casinos, N.Y. Daily News, Oct.
1, 1976, at 40; Lawmakers Reveal Casino Guidelines, Newark Star Ledger, Oct. 1, 1976, at 1.
102

HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMM'N ON THE REVIEW OF THE NAT'Il POLICY TOWARD

GAMBLING (May 10, 1976) (testimony of Frederick Fehl, acting Assistant Director, FBI); see
also United States v. Garrison, 348 F. Supp. 1112, 1119 (E.D. La. 1972) (commenting on
organized crime's use of gambling income to fund other operations).
103 Santaniello, Casino Gambling: The Elements of Efective Control, 6 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
23, 23 (1982); see also NEW JERSEY COMM'N OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATION: REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS ON CASINO GAMBLING, at III (1977) ("[Tlhe nature of the industry . . .

makes it a vulnerable target for criminal intrusion") (hereinafter cited to as COMM'N OF
INVESTIGATION, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS).
104 Profitability is. . .not a direct function of the quality of gaming or of the environment in and around the casino. Corporate corruption, cheating, loansharking,
overextension of credit, insobriety, prostitution and a honky-tonk atmosphere are
not antithetical to a desire for profit, and in the industry are occasionally viewed as
legitimate societal overhead so long as they encourage, or at least do not interfere
with, the vitality of the gambling market.
SECOND INTERIM REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY GOVERNORS'

STAFF POLICY GROUP ON

CASINO GAMBLING, at 1-2 (Feb. 17, 1977)(Statement of R. Martinez, Chmn.)[hereinafter
cited as STAFF POLICY GROUP,SECOND INTERIM REPORT].
105 See, e.g., COMM'N OF INVESTIGATION, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 103;
STAFF POLICY GROUP, SECOND INTERIM REPORT, supra note 104. The reports were based
on studies of gambling industries in other states and around the world.
106 COMM'N'OF INVESTIGATION, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 103, at II.
107 See note 110 infra.
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cause a casino grosses between $500,000 and $1 million per day,' 0 8 a
union could expect large payoffs to prevent a crippling strike.'0 9 Second, a corrupt union could demand illegal payments from legitimate
businessmen to ensure the safe, uninterrupted operation of the lucrative ancillary services.'' ° Third, the ready source of cash which
union coffers provide could finance all sorts of legitimate or illegitimate activities.' If organized crime were able to use these funds to
finance the operation of ancillary services and exert pressure through
the union to gain the service contracts, it would in effect have the
112
casinos in a stranglehold.
Aware of the peculiar attributes of the gambling industry and its
associated potential for entanglement with organized crime, the New
Jersey legislature passed the Casino Control Act.1 3 This tough, comprehensive regulation fulfilled New Jersey's promise to its citizens to
maintain the integrity of the casino industry." 4 Sections 86 and 93
restrict an employee's unfettered choice of a bargaining representative, but do not, as the Danzger majority concludes, constitute an
impermissible intrusion into federally created or protected rights
15
under section 7.1
108

[O]rganized Labor is in a prime position to exert tremendous pressure over the
casino industry: What would a casino owner pay for labor peace? How much is it
worth to keep a business that grosses between $500,000 and $1 million a day free of
a strike? A corrupt union could extort outright payments or use its power of persuasion to dictate what firms get the lucrative ancillary service contracts within the
casino industry.
Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees InternationalUnion: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm.
on Investigationsof the Senate Comm. on Governmental airs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 2 at 76 (1982)
(statement of New Jersey's Attorney General Kimmelman).
109 Id.
110 COMM'N OF INVESTIGATION, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 103 at 1-H.
The Special Commission of Investigation's experience and collected intelligence regarding organized crime strongly suggests that there are few better vehicles utilized
by organized crime to gain a stranglehold on an entire industry than labor racketeering. Organized crime control of certain unions often requires the legitimate businessmen who employ the services of the union members to pay extra homage to the
representatives of the underworld. Moreover the ready source of cash which union
coffers provide can be employed as financing of all sorts of legitimate or illicit
ventures.
Id.
111 Id.
112 See notes 106-110 supra and accompanying text.
113 See notes 101 and 107 supra and accompanying text.
114 See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text for discussion of §§ 86 and 93.
115 The Danziger majority concluded that none of the arguments advanced by the Commission and Division can avoid the controlling law of Hill v.Florida. Rather, "section 93 of
the Casino Control Act is preempted by section 7 of the NLRA insofar as it purports to confer
on the commission authority to disqualify as bargaining representatives the duly elected or
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Section 7 of the NLRA, as originally enacted, did not restrict an
employee's choice of representation. 116 But in 1959 Congress recognized a need to curb criminal infiltration into the labor movement
and enacted section 504(a) of the LMRDA," 7 which prohibited persons convicted of certain felonies from holding union office for a five
year period. "The LMRDA was adopted in part because state and
local authorities had failed to adopt effective measures to stamp out
crime and corruption [in unions] and guarantee internal union democracy. Consistent with this legislative purpose, Congress could
reasonably allow a state to adopt more restrictive eligibility
requirements."" 8
Section 504 is silent on the issue of whether a state may impose
additional disqualification criteria." 9 The Danzkger majority denies
the states this right, supporting its position in part by emphasizing
that certain sections of the LMRDA contain savings clauses that ex20
pressly recognize a state's right to provide additional remedies.'
Since Congress did not include such a clause in section 504, the majority infers a congressional intent to preclude the states from impos12 1
ing additional disqualification criteria.
22
The dissent correctly points out the fallacy of this conclusion. 1
23
At least one other section of the LMRDA is expressly preemptive
and, therefore, an inference equally as plausible as that espoused by
the majority can be drawn that Congress intended to preempt only
when it did so explicitly.

24

Relying on the absence of a savings

selected officials of a union certified by the Board as exclusive bargaining agent." 709 F.2d at
830. But see notes 131-45 infra and accompanying text.
116 See notes 45 and 54 supra and accompanying text.
117 See notes 58-64 supra and accompanying text for discussion of § 504.
118 International Longshoreman's Assoc. v. Waterfront Comm'n, 495 F. Supp 1101, 1123
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), afd in part and reo'din part on other grounds, 642 F.2d 666 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 966 (1981). The Longshoreman's Union brought this action challenging the validity
of New York's Waterfront Commission Act § 8, which set forth employment qualifications for
waterfront unions. The district court held that the Act could lawfully be enforced against
individuals whom it disqualified from service as waterfront union employees, but could not be
enforced against persons other than disqualified union employees for collecting and distributing union dues.
119 See notes 58-64 supra and accompanying text.
120 709 F.2d at 827-28. In support of this argument §§ 603(A) and 604 are cited. See note
63 supra and accompanying text.
121 Id.
122 709 F.2d at 842.
123 Section 483, 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1976), is expressly preemptive. Section 483 states, in
pertinent part: "the remedy provided by this subchapter for challenging an election already
conducted shall be exclusive." See also note 63 supra and accompanying text.
124 709 F.2d at 842; see also notes 62-64 and 120-23 supra and accompanying text.
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clause is, realistically, a futile attempt to divine congressional intent.
The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the enactment of the LMRDA is that Congress recognized that employees do
not have an absolute freedom to choose whomever they desire for
union representation. Rather, Congress recognized that the employ125
ees' choice is subject to limitations.
The Supreme Court's decision in D2eVeau, interpreting congressional intent, further suggests a congressional perception that when a
situation exists where crime, corruption, and racketeering threaten
126
the welfare of a state, comprehensive state regulation is needed.
Congress approved the New York Waterfront Compact despite the
protests from the International Longshoreman's Association that section 8 of the New York Waterfront Commission Act conflicted with
27
federal labor policy.
The regulations of the Casino Control Act are similar to those in
the Waterfront Commission Act. The New Jersey legislature perceived that labor corruption could become as severe and pervasive as
that which had existed on the New York waterfront. 28 To be sure,
New York acted only when the situation had reached an appalling
state, but "to write into preemptive jurisprudence a distinction between remedial and prophylactic legislation would prevent states
from acting until an industry is so rife with corruption that
'criminals, racketeers, and hoodlums [have] acquired a strangle125 These limitations are seen in § 504(a) of the LMRDA, which specifically addresses the
issue of disqualification criteria for union officials. See notes 58-64 supra and accompanying
text. Additional limitations on employees freedom are: § 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29
U.S.C. § 186 (1976), which addresses the issue of labor-management corruption; § 411 (A) of
Employee Retirment Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1111 (a) (1976), which provides protection against corruption in the administration of employee benefit plans by establishing disqualifying criteria for officers and employees of employee benefit plans; and the
Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951-1955 (1976), and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976), which both root out corruption in the
context of labor-related activities.
126 DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960); see also Hazelton v. Murray, 21 N.J. 115, 123,
121 A.2d 1, 5 (1956) (Justice Brennan wrote the opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court,
which sustained § 8 of New Jersey's Waterfront Commission Act). "If the conviction of crime
is a proper consideration related to the public interest for the purposes of licensing and registering waterfront workers, much more so is the provision here under review which would
wrest from the vicious criminal combine the means through which the corrupt conspiracy was
perpetrated."
127 See note 68supra; see also Hearingson H.R. 6286, HZ 6321, H.R 6343, andS 2383 Bfore
Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on theJudiciag, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 136 (1953). The Longshoreman's Association was the union most affected by § 8 of the Act.
128 "For years the New York Waterfront presented a notoriously serious situation. Urgent
need for drastic reform was generally recognized." 363 U.S. at 147.
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hold.' ",129 Situations where federal interests in section 7 are outweighed by a state's concern for protecting its welfare are rare, but
New Jersey has adequately demonstrated through studies, hearings,
and the experience of other jurisdictions, that the casino industry is
far more attractive to organized crime than other industries. The
dangers of criminal infiltration can only be avoided by the comprehensive regulations put forth in the Casino Control Act. These regulations are not inimical to the federal regulatory scheme, but
represent merely a "conscientious and well-reasoned attempt to erect
a breakwater against a tide of vice and corruption that could engulf
30
Atlantic City's casinos."'
B.

The Federal Interest

The application of the balancing test must include an analysis of
the impact the state regulation has on the federal regulatory scheme,
including a consideration of both substantive conflicts with the
NLRA and jurisdictional conflicts with the NLRB. 13 , The Casino
Control Act poses potential problems in both areas; however, the resulting harm to the federal scheme is insignificant.
The NLRA addressed two distinct concerns. 32 First, Congress
was concerned with the crippling effect industrial unrest had on interstate commerce. 3 3 Second, Congress was bothered by the inequality of bargaining power between an employer and his
employees.134 These policy concerns were drafted into section 1 of
the NLRA as follows:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to elim129 Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Int'l Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 709 F.2d 815, 850
(Becker, J., dissenting), quoting Hazelton v. Murray, 21 N.J. 115, 120, 121 A.2d 1, 4 (1956)
(Brennan, J.) (describing the conditions of the New York waterfront prior to the compact,
and sustaining the constitutionality of the provision in the New Jersey law which was identical to the provision sustained in DeVeau).
130 709 F.2d at 851 (Becker, J., dissenting).
131 See note 83 supra and accompanying text, which sets out the balancing test ofJones.
132 See notes 133-34 infra and accompanying text.
133 In NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261 (1938), the Supreme Court
said: "The history of the Act and its language show that its ruling purpose was to protect
interstate commerce by securing to employees the rights established by § 7 to organize, to bar:
gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities for that and other purposes." Id. at 265-66 (emphasis added); see also C. BUFFORD,
THE WAGNER AcT EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYER RELATIONS 1-8 (1941); 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1976).
134 "The second major objective of the bill is to encourage, by developing the procedure of
collective bargaining, that equality of bargaining power which is prerequisite to equality of
opportunity and freedom of contract." C. BUFFORD, supra note 133, at 6.
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inate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow
of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions
when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment
or other mutual aid or protection. 135

The Casino Control Act must be evaluated against this federal policy
background.
Substantively, by imposing disqualification criteria, the New
Jersey legislation conflicts with but a portion of section 7 of the
NLRA. Section 86 limits only the employees' right to choose bar-

gaining representation, while preserving the rights to organize and
bargain collectively. 136 Moreover, employees are not completely disabled from choosing their own bargaining representative; rather, em-

ployees are prevented only from choosing those representatives that
the state of New Jersey reasonably believes pose a threat to the integrity of the casino industry and to the safety of its citizens.1 37 The
casino employees retain the protection and bargaining strength of
13 8
the unions which Congress intended when it enacted the NLRA.

Additionally, the problems New Jersey faces in attempting to
maintain a crime-free casino industry lack the interstate character
with which the NLRA is primarily concerned. 3 9 Because of the lo135 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
136 See notes 39-44 supra and accompanying text, discussing the several protections of § 7
in addition to the right of representation of choice.
137 Sections 86 and 93, see notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text, do not prevent the
unionization of casino employees. They merely implement the policy considerations suggested at notes 100-12 and 128-30 sura and accompanying text.
138 See notes 136-37supra and accompanying text. The constructive purposes which made
the Act acceptable to Congress are nowhere more succinctly set forth than in a statement
President Roosevelt issued at the time he signed the Act:
A better relationship between labor and management is the high purpose of
this Act. By assuring the employees the right of collective bargaining it fosters the
development of the employment contract on a sound and equitable basis. By providing an orderly procedure for determining who is entitled to represent the employees, it aims to remove one of the chief causes of wasteful economic strife. By
preventing practices which tend to destroy the independence of labor, it seeks for
every worker within its scope freedom of choice and action which is justly his.
79 CONG. REc. 10,720 (1935) (statement of Pres. Roosevelt introduced into record by Sen.
Guffey). These purposes themselves are not thwarted by the Casino Control Act. In fact, by
preventing the infiltration of organized crime into labor union management, the New Jersey
Act helps insure the independence of the labor union and the freedom of the employee. A
union and employee controlled by organized crime are no better off than if they were controlled by management.
139 See note 133 supra and accompanying text.
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cal nature and the special characteristics of the casino industry, state
regulation of its associated unions impacts only slightly on interstate
commerce. 14° Rather, the New Jersey casino industry presents the
same type of local problem which Congress felt was best handled by
local legislation when it approved the Waterfront Compact to clean
14
up New York Harbor.

1

Procedurally, the Casino Control Act impinges on the jurisdiction of the NLRB; it empowers the Commission to disable a union
otherwise certified by the NLRB from collecting dues when union
officials fail to meet the qualifications of section 86.142 State power
and NLRB jurisdiction similarly conflicted in the DeVeau situation
where the Supreme Court held that Congress acquiesced in the exercise of dual jurisdiction. 143 Moreover, when Congress enacted the
NLRA, it expressly empowered the NLRB to cede jurisdiction to
state administrative bodies.144 Thus, although the NLRB has not expressly relinquished jurisdiction, exclusive jurisdiction by the NLRB
in all labor matters does not seem to be of tantamount importance to
Congress. Accordingly, an intrusion into this area by a specially
qualified state Commission with limited industry jurisdiction does
not seem to place an impermissible buirden on the NLRB's
140 This is not to say that regulation of the casino industry and its special problems are
beyond the reach of Congress under the powers granted to it under the commerce clause. Nor
is it to say that this is regulation of an integral state function and therefore reserved to the
states by the tenth amendment. (For an application of the tenth amendment as a means of
restricting federal legislation under the commerce clause, see National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). The casino industry surely impacts sufficiently on interstate
commerce to allow Congress, if it so desired, to regulate the industry under the power granted
it in the commerce clause.
However, there also exists a gray area where Congress could regulate, but has not. Special legislation for unions associated with the gambling industry is just such an area, and the
New Jersey regulations fill this void. Congress often defers to the states in those areas which,
because of the local nature of the problem, the state's closeness to the situation, and the lack
of substantial impact on interstate commerce, Congress finds that the problem is best handled
by the state. DrVeau presented such a situation. See notes 126-132 supra and accompanying
text; see also Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978), holding that a Washington
state law which required tug escorts in Puget Sound for tankers in excess of a certain weight
and not satisfying the state's design standards was not preempted, even though the Secretary
of Transportation had certified the tankers. The Court stated that the effect of the statute
was an additional cost of less than one cent per barrel of oil and had not affected the amount
of oil processed at Puget Sound. Id. at 179. It is difficult to imagine that significant effects on
interstate commerce will result from New Jersey's enforcement of §§ 86 and 93.
141 See notes 65-73 supra and accompanying text.
142 See note 20 supra for the authority of the Commission to prevent dues collection.
143 See note 65-73 supra and accompanying text.
144 See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction. 14 5
IV.

Conclusion

Section 7 rights are not absolute. Congress recognized this fact
when it enacted section 504(a) of the LMRDA, which expressly establishes disqualification criteria to halt criminal infiltration into labor unions. The state of New Jersey has also recognized this fact,
and passed the Casino Control Act which further restricts criminal
infiltration into union representation of casino employees. The federal and state statutes are complimentary; the New Jersey Act merely
supplements the federal effort in an area of unique local concern:
keeping the gambling industry free of the destructive influences of
organized crime.
The issue of whether sections 7 and 504(a) preempt state legislation in the area of representative qualifications is presently under review by the Supreme Court. If the Court holds New Jersey's statute
preempted, the state will become powerless to prevent organized
crime from gaining a stranglehold on the casino industry through the
instrumentality of the labor unions. The Court is thus urged to balance the interests in Danziger in favor of state action. Additionally,
Congress is urged to adopt federal legislation specifically authorizing
state regulation of union representation of casino employees. Such a
regulatory scheme would maintain the integrity of the casino industry and the safety of the people, while reasonably accommodating
the section 7 rights of casino employees. Attempting to stop organized crime from coming in the front door while the back door remains open is futile.
John F Gibbons
Louisj Weber, III

145 See note 55 supra and accompanying text. Because Congress itself has seen fit to expressly allow the NLRB to cede jurisdiction in § 10(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act and in the
same section has excluded certain industries unlesspredominanteylocal in character, it seems that
Congress does not consider it to be of vital importance that the NLRB maintain exclusive
jurisdiction over an industry which is not on the excluded list and is local in character.

